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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
It is likely that many, if not most, employees in the United States are 
unfamiliar with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), despite the 
ubiquitous use of computers in the workplace.1 The CFAA is a federal 
criminal statute, implemented to prosecute computer hacking at a time far 
removed from today’s technological landscape.2 Currently one of the 
broadest criminal laws in the United States Code, the CFAA potentially 
affects anyone who uses a computer.3 Despite the statute’s criminal stature, 
employers are increasingly using its civil provision to haul disloyal 
employees into federal court.4  
A typical employer CFAA cause of action alleges that an employee 
obtained information by accessing a computer either without authorization or 
in a manner that exceeded the employee’s authorized access.5 Whether the 
                                                 
 1  Sarah Boyer, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Abusing Federal Jurisdiction, 6 
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 661, 664 (2009) (describing how the nature of business has 
changed significantly over the past twenty-five years as a result of technological advances). 
 2  See infra Part II.A (detailing the initial enactment of the CFAA). 
 3  Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561 (2010) (describing how amendments to the CFAA potentially 
regulate use of every computer in the United States and millions abroad). 
 4  Michael D. Scott, SCOTT ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW, § 17.12 (3d ed. 
2012) (describing how employers are increasingly pursuing claims under the CFAA against 
employees who use company computers for personal reasons); see also Lee v. PMSI, Inc., No. 
8:10 CV 2904 T 23TBM, 2011 WL 1742028, at *1, *3 (M.D. Fla. May 6, 2011) (dismissing a 
counterclaim by employer who alleged CFAA violation for employee’s use of Facebook on 
company computer); see also Clarity Servs., Inc. v. Barney, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1316 
(M.D. Fla. 2010) (expressing skepticism that an employee violates the CFAA simply by 
checking personal e-mail at work). 
 5  Molly Eichten, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act–A Survey of Recent Cases, 
66 BUS. LAW 231, 232 (2010). The typical employer CFAA claim involves an employee who 
2
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CFAA is limited to hacking or extends to employees who misuse company 
computers hinges entirely on how a court interprets the terms “without 
authorization” and “exceeds authorized access.”6 Applying the CFAA to this 
common situation has resulted in a split of authority as courts struggle with 
the definition of “authorization.”7    
Some courts construe the term “authorization” narrowly.8 An 
employee’s misuse or misappropriation of the employer’s business 
information is not “without authorization” as long as the employer gave the 
employee permission to access the information.9 Once an employee is 
granted authorization to access an employer’s computers, the CFAA is not 
violated despite subsequent misuse of the information.10 Other courts 
construe the term broadly, recognizing an employer’s cause of action when 
an employee obtains business information with disloyal intent or in breach of 
an agreement.11  
The CFAA’s vast reach, along with commonplace use of computers 
in business, makes it critical to clearly define the statute’s scope.12 
Unfortunately, the divisive split brings more questions than clarity and 
allows the CFAA to be used in unprecedented ways.13 With the Supreme 
Court’s recent dismissal of a certiorari petition on the issue and 
Congressional efforts focused elsewhere, courts are faced with the 
responsibility of clearly and accurately interpreting the CFAA.14      
                                                                                                                   
obtains confidential or proprietary information from the employer’s computer system while 
still employed but subsequently leaves the company. Id. at 232–33. The employee then uses 
information to the employer’s detriment, often in direct competition with the employer. When 
discovered, employers bring claims against the employee under the CFAA, often with state 
tort claims for breach of contract. 
 6  Id. at 231. 
 7  Ajuba Intl. LLC v. Saharia, 871 F. Supp. 2d 671, 685–87 (E.D. Mich. 2012) 
(detailing the current circuit split of authority regarding whether the CFAA applies in 
employer-employee situations). 
 8  LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
an employee acts without authorization when he has no permission to access computers at all 
or such permission is rescinded). 
 9  Id. 
 10  Ajuba, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 687. 
 11  See Int’l Airport Ctr., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); EF Cultural 
Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001) (identifying agency-based 
interpretation in Citrin and a contract-based interpretation in Explorica). 
 12  Paul J. Larkin, Jr., United States v. Nosal: Rebooting the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 8 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 257, 261 (2012) (lamenting the need for more 
specificity in determining which actions create liability under the CFAA as the CFAA can be 
used in unprecedented ways not intended by Congress). 
 13  Id. 
 14  WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012), 
cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831; see also Alan W. Nicgorski, Employees Exceeding Authorized 
Access? Trends in Interpreting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 30 No. 18 WESTLAW J. 
COMPUTER & INTERNET 1 (2013) (describing how a recent spark in Congressional efforts to 
amend the CFAA has seemingly stalled); see also Sebastian E. Kaplan, The Rise of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Case, 17. No. 4 CYBERSPACE LAW 14, 14 (2012) (explaining 
3
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This Comment contends that broad interpretations of the CFAA 
implicate constitutional vagueness and overbreadth concerns, are 
inconsistent with the underlying policy of the statute, and result in 
inappropriate federal jurisdiction for traditional state law claims.15 Only a 
narrow interpretation of the CFAA keeps the statute constitutional and 
fulfills Congress’s original and primary intent to punish criminal computer 
hackers and people who abuse legitimate access privileges.16  
Part II of this Comment examines the history and legislative intent 
behind the CFAA, focusing on the types of crime Congress targeted and the 
balance Congress intended to strike by not preempting the field of computer 
crimes.17 Part II also traces the important amendments throughout the 
statute’s relatively short history and details current actions under the 
CFAA.18 Part III explores several relevant doctrines and canons of statutory 
construction that courts should consider when interpreting the CFAA.19   
Part IV discusses the current circuit split, summarizing the 
development and rationale behind each theory.20 It examines how each 
theory handles “authorization,” and how employers fare when presenting 
misappropriation claims.21 Part V contends that broad interpretations of the 
CFAA do not meet constitutional requirements under the void for vagueness 
doctrine or the doctrine of overbreadth.22 Moreover, courts applying a broad 
interpretation of the CFAA shirk their duty to effectuate Congressional intent 
by avoiding established canons of statutory construction and demolish 
Congress’s intended scope by trampling existing state laws.23 In addition to 
enumerating the deficiencies of broad interpretations, Part V also outlines 
how a narrow interpretation’s restrained reading of the statutory language 
complies with relevant doctrines, follows canons of construction, and 
                                                                                                                   
current Congressional proposals include Senator Leahy’s revision to limit liability to 
exceeding authorized access to seven categories of sensitive information, and Senators 
Grassley and Franken’s proposal to carve out an exception to the statute for violating terms of 
service agreements). 
 15  See infra Part V (arguing why the CFAA requires a narrow interpretation). 
 16  See infra Parts IV–V (concluding that a narrow interpretation comports with 
the intent of the CFAA and canons of construction). 
 17  See infra Part II.A–D (outlining why the CFAA was enacted, discussing the 
exact type of crime and scope that Congress intended for the CFAA to cover). 
 18  See infra Part II.E–F (describing amendments of the CFAA and current 
actions). 
 19  See infra Part III (outlining various doctrines and canons of statutory 
construction). 
 20  See infra Part IV (detailing the current circuit split). 
 21  See infra Part IV (describing the effect of each theory). 
 22  See infra Part V.A–B (contending that agency and contract-based 
interpretations of the CFAA do not provide the required notice to meet due process concerns, 
and leave the CFAA vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement and overbreadth concerns). 
 23  See infra Part V.C–E (describing the deficiencies of broad interpretations 
through their noncompliance with doctrines, canons of statutory construction, and avoidance 
of Congressional intent). 
4
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effectuates Congressional intent.24 This Comment concludes that the only 
way to keep the CFAA constitutional is for courts to interpret it narrowly; 
any other interpretation undermines the purpose and scope of the statute 
while raising constitutional concerns.25  
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
Although computer crime statutes exist in all fifty states and on the 
federal level today, they remain a relatively new concept.26 The Counterfeit 
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, more commonly 
referred to as the CFAA, was enacted in 1984 and is the primary federal 
statute used to combat computer crime.27 The CFAA criminalizes accessing a 
computer without authorization or accessing a computer by exceeding the 
authorization given.28 Originally narrow in scope and aimed at criminal 
hackers, rapidly advancing technology and expansive amendments exploded 
the CFAA’s use, transforming it into one of the most far-reaching criminal 
statutes in the United States Code.29 A surge in the number of CFAA claims 
brought by employers against disloyal employees followed a 1996 update to 
the definition of “protected computers.”30 Consequently, a majority of the 
law addressing the meaning and scope of the CFAA developed within the 
context of employment disputes.31 Despite numerous amendments and 
                                                 
 24  See infra Part V (demonstrating the benefits of narrowly interpreting the 
CFAA).  
 25  See infra Parts V–VI (explaining how a narrow interpretation is the only way to 
keep the CFAA constitutional and to effectuate the legislative intent). 
 26  Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” 
in Computer Misuse Statute, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1615 (2003) (noting that Florida was 
the first state to pass a computer crime statute in 1978, and Vermont was the last state to pass 
its version of a computer crime statute in 1999. Congress passed the first federal statute in 
1984). 
 27  Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, PUB. 
L. NO. 98-473, § 2102(a); § 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92. Initially enacted in 1984, § 1030 became 
known as the CFAA with the 1986 amendments; see also S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 5 (1996) 
(“[a]s intended when the law was originally enacted, the Computer Fraud and Abuse statute 
facilitates addressing in a single statute the problem of computer crime, rather than identifying 
and amending every potentially applicable statute affected by advances in computer 
technology.”). 
 28  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c); Ajuba, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 684. 
 29  See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, at 2 (2007) 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf. The CFAA has 
been amended multiple times as Congress attempts to keep pace with changes in technology. 
Initially enacted in 1984, subsequent amendments followed in 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994, 
1996, 2001, 2002, and 2008. Id. See also Kaplan, supra note 14, at 14 (tallying a 600% 
increase in complaints alleging a cause of action under the CFAA since 2002). 
 30  Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized Access, Trespass, and Privacy, 
62 BUS. LAW 1395, 1408 (2007). After the CFAA’s 1996 amendments, the number of civil 
cases quickly eclipsed the number of criminal cases prosecuted. Id. 
 31  United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 456–57 (C.D. Cal 2009) (explaining 
that a majority of CFAA case law has been developed in the context of civil cases). 
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repeated use of the term throughout the statute, “without authorization” 
remains undefined.32 A predicate for liability under the CFAA, this 
undefined term has led to a three-way split of authority concerning the 
proper interpretation of the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds 
authorized access.”33  
 
A. The Need for a Computer Crime Statute Becomes Obvious 
 
Understanding the problem Congress faced and identifying the type 
of behavior Congress intended to target through the CFAA is critical to 
defining the statute’s proper scope.34 Subdividing computer crimes into two 
categories—traditional crimes committed using computers, and crimes of 
computer misuse—helps demonstrate the specific type of crime the CFAA 
was enacted to target.35 Congress’s aim in enacting the CFAA was 
specifically to deter and combat only crimes of computer misuse.36 
Traditional crimes using computers involve the online commission 
or facilitation of traditional criminal offenses that ordinarily do not include a 
computer.37 The elements of such crimes are not affected by the use of a 
computer and remain susceptible to federal prosecution under existing 
criminal statutes.38 For example, a death threat is still a death threat whether 
sent through email or postal mail; the involvement of a computer does not 
affect the ability to prosecute the crime.39 These traditional crimes using 
                                                 
 32  See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006); see also S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 13 (1986) 
(“without authorization” contained in § 1030(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5)(A), (5)(B), (5)(C), (6), and 
(7)(B) was not defined because Congress thought it was “self-explanatory”). 
 33  Ajuba, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 686 (describing the current split of authority 
concerning the proper interpretation of “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized 
access” before ultimately deciding that the narrow interpretation is the better approach). 
 34  Kerr, supra note 26, at 1602. Computer crime statutes were a response to 
perceived failures of preexisting laws to respond to crimes of computer misuse. Amendments 
to the CFAA were enacted to address changes in computer technology, “particularly new 
computer abuse techniques such as computer viruses and worms, which make prosecutions 
difficult in some types of cases.” Id. See also S. REP. NO. 101-544 (1990). 
 35  See Kerr, supra note 26, at 1602–05. Scholar Orin Kerr’s categorical approach 
to computer crimes helps clearly delineate Congress’s targeted crimes. 
 36  S. REP. NO. 101-544 (1990). 
Overall, existing criminal statutes provide an adequate framework for the 
prosecution of most types of computer-related criminal conduct. Existing fraud, 
embezzlement, theft, and destruction of property statutes can be used to punish 
those who commit these types of offenses with the assistance of a computer. 
However, as computer criminals become more sophisticated, using viruses, worms 
and other types of computer software and hardware to commit heretofore 
unanticipated offenses, the criminal code must be readjusted to keep up with these 
developments. 
Id. 
 37  Kerr, supra note 26, at 1602–03. 
 38  Id. Examples of traditional crimes committed using computers include internet 
fraud schemes, online distribution of child pornography, and cyberstalking.  
 39  Id. 
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computers did not require new laws to protect against abuse at the state level 
either, since a hallmark of federalism placed these issues squarely within 
state police powers.40 
Computer misuse crimes, on the other hand, represented a new type 
of crime.41 Computer misuse crimes consist of conduct that intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causes interference with the proper 
functioning of computers and computer networks.42 Common computer 
misuse crimes include hacking or distributing viruses.43 The government had 
difficulty prosecuting computer misuse crimes under traditional criminal 
statutes like trespass, burglary, and theft because the elements of traditional 
crimes tie closely to the physical world, while the elements of computer 
misuse crimes do not.44 For example, a computer hacker can illicitly steal a 
computer program without physically trespassing or depriving the owner of 
possession.45 Even though the hacker has committed a wrongful act, 
prosecution under traditional trespass, burglary or theft statutes would be 
difficult because elements such as the defendant’s physical intrusion onto the 
owner’s property, or the defendant physically depriving the owner of his 
property, are not met.46 The CFAA was created to protect people and 
property against only these new computer misuse crimes by filling in gaps 
where existing crime statutes could not account for the unique problem posed 
by computer data.47 
                                                 
 40  Id.; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 66 (2005) (referencing the state’s 
“traditional police powers to define the criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of their citizens”); see also Advanced Aerofoil Techs., AG v. Todaro, No. 11 Civ 
9505, 2013 WL 410873 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2013) (dismissing an employer’s CFAA 
claim alleging misuse of company information, but noting that employer may still have 
remedies available to it under state and common law). 
 41  H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 20 (1984) as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 
3695 (“[i]t is obvious that traditional theft/larceny statutes are not the proper vehicle to control 
the spate of computer abuse and computer assisted crimes.”). 
 42  Kerr, supra note 26, at 1603–04. This type of conduct misuses and violates the 
rights and privileges that the computer or account owner expects to have over their computer 
or account. Id. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Kerr, supra note 26, at 1605–11. For example, traditional trespass and burglary 
require the defendant to physically trespass on someone else’s property, and deprive the 
rightful owner of physical possession. The limited scope is difficult to apply to computer 
misuse because the user doesn’t physically enter another’s property, or physically 
misappropriate a tangible thing. Even when courts identified a computer as a property interest, 
it became difficult to explain how computer misuse actually deprived the owner of that 
property.  
 45  Id. 
 46  Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10 (1984) (explaining why computer 
misuse crimes did not fit well into categories of property subject to abuse or theft). 
 47  Garrett D. Urban, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The Limitations of 
Current Judicial Interpretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1369, 1388–89 (2011). Congress’s intent was for the 
CFAA to target new forms of computer crimes not currently addressed by federal or state 
criminal statutes. Despite technological advances, using computers to carry out traditional 
7
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B. The Initial Enactment of the CFAA in 1984 
 
Computer crime statutes did not exist when computer misuse became 
a cognizable problem in the 1970s.48 The federal government responded to 
these new crimes by enacting the first computer-crime statute as part of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.49 Consciously narrow in scope 
and aimed at hackers, the statute was limited to protecting classified 
information, financial records, and credit information stored on computers 
owned by the government and financial institutions.50  
Unfortunately, the concentrated scope of the 1984 statute drew 
immediate criticism from legislatures, industry leaders, and law enforcement 
officials.51 The limiting language in the original version was so narrowly 
drawn that the statute could not be effectively used.52 The statute’s 
ineffectiveness coupled with the increasing use of computers in public and 
private sectors led to significant changes in 1986.53  
 
                                                                                                                   
crimes did not require new laws, and had always been implemented and enforced by states as 
part of their police powers. 
 48  Katherine Mesenbring Field, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining 
Employees’ Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819, 
835 (2009) (detailing the legislative history and concluding that the CFAA seeks to capture 
crimes of computer misuse rather than traditional offenses using a computer). 
 49  H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 20 (1984). “It is noteworthy that section 1030 deals 
with an ‘unauthorized access’ concept of computer fraud rather than the mere use of a 
computer.” The conduct prohibited in the CFAA is analogous to breaking and entering rather 
than using a computer (similar to the use of a gun) in committing a crime. Specifically, the 
CFAA targets crimes where the computer is the victim and not crimes that simply use a 
computer to commit another traditional crime. See also Charles Doyle, Cybercrime: An 
Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal 
Laws, Congressional Research Service, 7-5700 Dec. 27, 2010 at 1 (describing the CFAA as, 
“not a comprehensive provision, but instead it fills cracks and gaps in the protection afforded 
by other federal criminal laws.”). 
 50  Id. Legislators considered and rejected a broader scope, concentrating instead 
only on the most vital federal interests. See Dodd S. Griffith, The Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act of 1986: A Measured Response to A Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453, 455–56 
(1990).  
 51  Frank P. Andreano, The Evolution of Federal Computer Crime Policy: The Ad 
Hoc Approach to An Ever-Changing Problem, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81, 86 (1999); see also 
Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1030), 174 A.L.R. Fed. 101 at 1 (2001); see Griffith, supra note 
50, at 485 (noting the widespread dissatisfaction with the original statute. Described as both 
“overly vague and too narrow in scope,” prosecution proved difficult under the statute which 
decreased its deterrent value). 
 52  S. REP. No. 99-432, at 6 (1986). The original statute limited the information 
protected by referencing the Right to Financial Privacy Act. Recognizing that important 
financial information existed outside the scope of this narrow Act, Congress extended the 
protection to financial records of all customers of financial institutions. 
 53  See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3-4 (1986); see also Griffith, supra note 50, at 483. 
The 1986 amendments were necessary to broaden protection to cover private sector computers 
and facilitate federal prosecution of computer-related crimes. 
8
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C. The 1986 Amendments: The CFAA is Born 
 
The extensive 1986 amendments gave the statute its current name: 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).54 Congress expanded the 
statute’s scope by modifying existing crimes, adding new offenses, changing 
intent requirements, and adding definitions.55 Despite the statute’s increased 
scope, its premise remained the same and Congress kept the CFAA’s 
jurisdiction limited to crimes involving a compelling federal interest.56  
Congress made several changes to remove accidental access and the 
use of legitimately obtained information from the CFAA’s scope.57 
Additionally, Congress added a subsection to define key terms and expand 
the definition of “federal interest computer.”58 The CFAA initially applied to 
a person who either (1) knowingly accessed without authorization, or (2) 
“having accessed a computer with authorization, use[d] the opportunity such 
access provide[d] for purposes to which such authorization [did] not 
extend.”59 Congress replaced the latter phrase with the defined term “exceeds 
authorized access.”60 The term “exceeds authorized access” is defined as “to 
access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter 
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or 
alter.”61 Further, “exceeds authorized access” remains an element in multiple 
                                                 
 54  See supra note 27.  
 55  S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3–4 (1986). 
 56  Buckman, supra note 51, at 1 (limiting the CFAA’s jurisdictions to cases 
involving a compelling federal interest). See also S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3–4 (1986) (“The 
premise . . . will remain the protection, for privacy reasons, of computerized credit records and 
computerized information relating to customers’ relationships with financial institutions. This 
protection is imperative in light of the sensitive and personal financial information contained 
in such computer files.”). 
 57  Griffith, supra note 50, at 463 (changing the language to ensure that the 
provision would not be construed to prohibit computer access for legitimate business 
purposes, the Senate report stated the sole purpose of subsection (a)(2) was to “deter hackers 
and other criminals from accessing computerized financial files without authorization.”).  
 58  Andreano, supra note 51, at 86–87; 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1987) 
(expanding the definition of a “federal interest” computer to cover crimes committed using 
computers in more than one state). 
 59  PUB. L. NO. 98-473 § 2102, 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–91 (1984). 
 60  See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 21 (1986) (stating the reason for the amendment was 
to eliminate coverage for authorized access used for improper purpose). 
This removes from the sweep of the statute one of the murkier grounds of 
liability, under which a Federal employee's access to computerized data 
might be legitimate in some circumstances, but criminal in other (not 
clearly distinguishable) circumstances that might be held to exceed his 
authorization. As the committee report points out, administrative sanctions 
should ordinarily be adequate to deal with real abuses of authorized 
access. 
Id. 
 61  See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6); see also Walsh Bishop Assocs., Inc. v. O’Brien, 
No. 11-2673, 2012 WL 669069 at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 28, 2012) (concluding that the reason for 
the amendment was to remove use as a basis for exceeding authorization). 
9
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CFAA provisions.62 Even though Congress included definitions for several 
key terms, “without authorization” remains undefined.63 
Primarily designed to punish and deter the theft of information from 
outside hackers, legislative history affirms that Congress always intended for 
the CFAA to apply to insiders who intentionally damaged protected 
computers.64 This distinction is expressed in the statutory language: outsiders 
would be “without authorization” while insiders would “exceed authorized 
access.”65 Outside intruders accessing a protected computer “without 
authorization” faced criminal liability for any intentional, reckless, or even 
negligent, damage caused by their trespass.66 Congress raised the intent 
standard from “knowingly” to “intentionally” in several subsections to 
emphasize that “intentional acts of unauthorized access—rather than 
mistaken, inadvertent, or careless ones—are precisely what the Committee 
intends to proscribe.”67  
                                                 
 62  Andreano, supra note 51, at 87. 
 63  See supra note 32.  
 64  See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 20 (1984). The original House Report supporting 
passage of the first CFAA cited to two cases to illustrate the need for a computer crime 
statute; both involved unauthorized access by former employees. This indicates Congress was 
not solely focused on deterring hackers when passing the original CFAA statute; See also S. 
REP. NO. 104-357, at 9 (1996) (“[t]he law currently protects computers or computer systems 
from damage caused by either outside hackers or malicious insiders. . .’”). 
 65  S. REP. NO. 99-432 (1986) (Congress distinguishes between the terms “without 
authorization” and “exceeds authorized access,” using the first to apply to outside hackers, and 
the second applicable only to insiders, i.e. people within a company). A clear example is the 
amended § 1030(a)(3) which contains the term “unauthorized access” but not “exceeds 
authorized access.” Congress removed “exceeds authorized access” to “preclude liability in 
purely ‘insider’ cases.” See also Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation 
of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 913 n.16 (2003) 
(describing an outsider as anyone who intrudes on a computer from outside the organization, 
as opposed to an insider who exceeds their authorized access by viewing sensitive data or 
entering into a restricted computer); see also S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 8–11 (1996) (detailing 
the sentencing scheme for the CFAA and the rationale for why insiders and outsiders are 
treated differently). 
 66  S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 5–6 (1986) (explaining that unsure of evolving 
technology, Congress changed the intent standard to “intentionally” in order to exclude 
individuals who “inadvertently ‘stumble[d] into’ someone else’s computer file or computer 
data,” especially where such individual was authorized to use a particular computer”); S. REP. 
NO. 104-357, at 11 (1996) (“[i]nsiders . . . authorized to access a computer, face criminal 
liability only if they intend to cause damage to the computer, not for recklessly or negligently 
causing damage. By contrast, outside hackers who break into a computer could be punished 
for any intentional, reckless, or other damage they cause by their trespass.”).  
 67  S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 7 (1986). Further focusing the scope, the Senate Report 
clarified that the statute was not meant to cover employees’ authorized to access computers 
that acted in a way that, although wrong, did not rise to the level of criminal conduct.  
It is not difficult to envision an employee . . . who, while authorized to use 
a particular computer in one department, briefly exceeds his authorized 
access and peruses data belonging to the department that he is not 
supposed to look at. This is especially true where the department in 
question lacks a clear method of delineating which individuals are 
authorized to access certain of its data. The Committee believes that 
10
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D. Congress’s Careful Balance Between State and Federal Statutes 
 
Senate reports contain clear evidence that despite widening the scope 
of the CFAA in 1986, Congress did not intend for the amendments to 
preempt the entire field of computer crime or to make every offense 
involving a computer a crime under the Act.68 Although states had not 
uniformly addressed the still-emerging issue of computer crimes, forty-seven 
states had enacted specific computer crime statutes by 1986.69 Congress 
rejected proposals to make the statute so sweeping that “no computer crime 
is potentially uncovered,” and decided a more appropriate balance would be 
to limit the CFAA to crimes concerning a compelling federal interest or 
crimes interstate in nature.70 Congress intentionally left room for states to be 
undisturbed by the moderate reach of the CFAA and able to develop their 
own solutions to the burgeoning issue.71  
 
E. The Civil Provision and Expanded Definitions Continue to Broaden the 
CFAA’s Scope 
 
Congress added the private cause of action to the felony provisions 
of the CFAA in 1994 to allow victims to recover damages for economic loss 
                                                                                                                   
administrative sanctions are more appropriate than criminal punishment in 
such a case. The Committee wishes to avoid the danger that every time an 
employee exceeds his authorized access to his department’s computers—
no matter how slightly—he could be prosecuted. 
Id. 
 68  S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 4 (1986). “Throughout its consideration of computer 
crime, the Committee has been especially concerned about the appropriate scope of Federal 
jurisdiction in this area.” Id. 
 69  Id.; see Griffith, supra note 50, at 485 (describing why Congress chose not to 
preempt a significant body of law by limiting the scope of the CFAA to compelling federal 
interest). 
 70  S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 4; see Griffith, supra note 50, at 484 (acknowledging 
“the Judiciary Committee’s long-standing policy of limiting federal crimes to matters of 
compelling federal interest or to criminal acts that state or local governments were incapable 
of handling.”). 
 71  Griffith, supra note 50, at 484; see also S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 4 (1986). 
It has been suggested that, because some States lack comprehensive 
computer crime statutes of their own, the Congress should enact as 
sweeping a Federal statute as possible so that no computer crime is 
potentially uncovered. The Committee rejects this approach and prefers 
instead to limit Federal jurisdiction over computer crime to those cases in 
which there is a compelling federal interest, i.e., where computers of the 
Federal Government or certain financial institutions are involved, or 
where the crime itself is interstate in nature. The Committee is convinced 
that this approach strikes the appropriate balance between the Federal 
Government’s interest in computer crime and the interests and abilities of 
the States to proscribe and punish such offenses. 
Id. 
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against wrongdoers as a civil remedy.72 Congressional records indicate that 
the civil provision was a reaction to a dramatic rise in the number of 
computer crime cases and the government’s inability to pursue all of these 
claims.73 The civil remedy was designed to provide injured individuals with a 
remedy and to increase the deterrent value of the statute.74 Employers 
enthusiastically embraced this civil remedy as a way to recapture 
compensatory damages or obtain injunctive relief against former 
employees.75 
Increasing national reliance on computer networks mixed with 
concern over notorious and highly destructive reports of hacking led to 
further expansions of the statute.76 Although the term “federal interest 
computer” was replaced with “protected computer” in 1996, subsequent 
amendments significantly broadened the term.77 Addressing the interstate 
nature of computer networks, in 2008 Congress injected the phrase “affecting 
interstate commerce” into the definition of “protected computer” to permit 
jurisdiction as far as its Commerce Clause power allowed.78 Currently, any 
                                                 
 72  See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, PUB. L. NO. 
103-322 tit. XXIX § 290001, 108 Stat. 1796 Title XXIX 2097-99 (1994) (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1030). The 1994 amendments were part of the larger Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. In addition to adding a civil provision, § 1030(g), other 
amendments expanded the statute to apply to computer damage incurred accidentally and even 
without negligence.  
 73  Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. 
REV. 320, 329 (2004); 146 Cong. Rec. S10, 916 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
 74  S. REP. NO. 101-544, at 9 (1990) (introducing the civil provision as a remedy 
that “would authorize private suits in an area that law enforcement has sometimes been 
reluctant to investigate or prosecute. Deterrence is another goal.”). 
 75  See Winn, supra note 30 (explaining the increase in CFAA claims by 
employers). 
 76  Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: 
Two Problems and Two Solutions, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 429, 453 (2009). 
 77  The USA Patriotic Act of 2001 expanded “protected computers” to include 
computers outside the United States if involved in interstate or foreign commerce. The 2008 
amendment, part of the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act, removed the 
requirement of interstate communication, making any unauthorized access to any protected 
computer that retrieves any kind of information (either interstate or intrastate) punishable 
under the statute. A “protected computer” is any computer “which is used in . . . interstate or 
foreign commerce or communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2012). This broad 
definition encompasses nearly every computer since a connection to the internet satisfies this 
requirement. See Daniel J. Winters & John F. Costello, Jr., The Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act: A new weapon in the trade secrets litigation arena, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Vol. 44, 
No. 3 April 2005.  
 78  S. REP. NO. 101-544, at 9 (1990) (explaining that the Commerce Clause was an 
appropriate addition to the CFAA due to “the interstate nature of computer networks, and the 
ease with which computer abuse, such as destructive computer viruses or worms, can spread 
across State lines”); see also United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(explaining that computers’ connection to the internet rendered them part of a system 
inexorably intertwined with interstate commerce and thus properly within the realm of 
12
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computer or device capable of connecting to the internet is a “protected 
computer” within the CFAA’s scope.79 Overall, the numerous amendments 
and legislative history of the relatively young CFAA indicate a conscious 
broadening of the CFAA in both scope and breadth.80  However, these 
purposeful expansions are accurately attributed to Congress’s desire to 
effectively prosecute serious interstate computer crimes in the face of 
evolving technology rather than an intent to displace existing state laws or 
preempt all computer crimes.81  
 
F. Current Actions Triggering liability Under the CFAA 
 
With all internet-accessible computers protected under the CFAA, 
the current version of the statute provides criminal and civil liability when an 
individual: (1) intentionally accesses a computer “without authorization” or 
“exceeds authorized access,” and (2) engages in one of seven types of 
prohibited conduct.82 The private, civil right of action is currently limited to 
felony violations under the criminal law.83 A party bringing a private, civil 
action must establish two essential elements: (1) a violation of one of the 
seven proscribed activities resulting in damage or loss, and (2) a violation 
                                                                                                                   
Congress’s Commerce Clause power) (citing United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 
(3rd Cir. 2006)); see Buckman, supra note 51 (explaining, “since the advent of the Internet, 
almost all computer use has become interstate in nature.”). 
 79  18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2); see also Cont’l Group, Inc. v. KW Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 
622 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (“[a] connection to the internet is ‘affecting 
interstate commerce or communication.’”).  
 80  Matthew Kapitanyan, Beyond Wargames: How the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act Should Be Interpreted In the Employment Context, 7 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 
405, 415–16 (2012). 
 81  S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 5 (1996). “As computers continue to proliferate in 
businesses and homes, and new forms of computer crimes emerge, Congress must remain 
vigilant to ensure that the Computer Fraud and Abuse statute is up-to-date and provides law 
enforcement with the necessary legal framework to fight computer crime. [1996 amendments] 
will likely not represent the last amendment to this statute, but is necessary and constructive 
legislation to deal with the current increase in computer crime”; see also 139 Cong. Rec. 
S16421-03, 1993 WL 490040 (“It is important to update our laws to stay abreast of rapid 
changes in computer technology and computer abuse crimes”) (statement of Senator Leahy, 
the sponsor of the bill). See also S. REP. NO. 101-544, at 11 (1990) (reporting that introducing 
the civil provision was not expected to incur any significant cost to the federal government).  
 82  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(7) (2008); see Andrew T. Hernacki, A Vague Law in A 
Smartphone World: Limiting the Scope of Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U. L. Rev. 1543, 1551 (2012) (summarizing each of the current 
subsections of the CFAA). The seven actions include: (1) obtaining national security 
information, (2) compromising the confidentiality of a computer; (3) trespassing in a 
Government computer; (4) accessing a computer to defraud and obtain value; (5) transmission 
or access that causes damage; (6) trafficking in passwords; and (7) extortion involving threats 
to damage computer). Id. 
 83  See Winn, supra note 30, at 1405. 
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must involve one of five aggravating factors enumerated in the statute.84 
Employers typically bring a civil action under the aggravating factor of 
losses exceeding $5,000.85 The least demanding CFAA provision allows 
liability for anyone who intentionally accesses and obtains information from 
any protected computer without authorization or by exceeding authorized 
accessed.86  
Traditionally employer-employee and company-consumer 
relationships have been governed by tort and contract law, but employers are 
finding the CFAA’s invitation to federal court an attractive lure.87 The 
CFAA’s civil provision allows employers to charge both the former 
employee and the former employee’s new company and permits injunctive 
relief.88 The civil provision opens the door to federal jurisdiction while 
supplemental jurisdiction permits the inevitable litany of accompanying state 
law claims to be adjudicated as well.89  
Employers are often able to find relief under a CFAA claim with a 
much lower evidentiary standard compared with the same claim in state 
                                                 
 84  18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). The aggravating factors are: (I) loss to one or more 
persons during any one-year period aggregating at least $5000 in value; (II) the modification 
or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medical examination, 
diagnosis, treatment, or care of one or more individuals; (III) physical injury to any person; 
(IV) a threat to public health or safety; and (V) damage affecting a computer used by or for an 
entity of the United States government in furtherance of the administration of justice, national 
defense, or national security. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(V). Id. 
 85  Robert C. Kain, Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Employee Hacking 
Legal in California and Virginia, but Illegal in Miami, Dallas, Chicago, and Boston, 87 FLA. 
B.J. 36, 38 (2013) (listing all the civil liabilities, but noting the typical basis for civil action).  
 86  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). Because a “protected computer” is any computer 
with internet access, and “obtain” includes merely viewing information, any person who 
intentionally views information on a computer can potentially incur liability depending on 
how the court interprets authorization. See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6 (1986) (clarifying that 
“obtain” includes viewing information, and does not require any downloading or copying); see 
also United States v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1125–26 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that each of 
the statute’s seven subsection addresses a different type of harm, and rejecting defendant’s 
contention that § 1030(a)(2)(C) required anything more than intention to access a protected 
computer without authorization or by exceeding authorized use in order to obtain 
information).  
 87  United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing 
employment dispute as an area traditionally governed by tort and contract law); see also 
Thomas E. Booms, Hacking into Federal Court: Employee “Authorization” Under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 543, 551 (2011). Examples of 
commonly ancillary state law claims include tortious interference with business relations, theft 
of trade secrets, breach of employment contracts, or breach of fiduciary duty. 
 88  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a), (g). 
 89  Id.; see Brenton, supra note 76, at 451. The supplemental jurisdiction statute 
states that once a plaintiff gains access to federal court through federal question jurisdiction, 
as they would if stating a claim under the federal CFAA statute, they are able to ask the 
federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that form “part of the 
same case or controversy” as the plaintiff’s federal claim. In a CFAA claim the same allegedly 
wrongful act will frequently give rise to all claims allowing the plaintiff’s state law claims to 
satisfy the initial supplemental jurisdiction requirements. Id. 
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court.90 Trade secret litigation provides an excellent example of how policy-
driven balancing tests meted out in state courts are easily avoided through a 
CFAA claim.91 Prevailing under a state court trade secret claim typically 
requires the employer to prove that (1) the inappropriately accessed 
information was a legally protected trade secret, (2) the employer took steps 
to protect the information’s secrecy, and (3) the departing employee 
misappropriated the information.92 In contrast, a CFAA claim automatically 
protects any information accessed through a computer, making it much easier 
for employers to successfully recover.93 Recovering under broad 
interpretations of the CFAA is possible once an employer proves that an 
employee accessed a computer without authorization and demonstrates the 
necessary damages.94  
 
III.  RELEVANT DOCTRINES AND CANONS OF STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION 
 
Doctrines and canons of statutory construction exist to ensure the 
constitutionality of statutes and to help courts effectuate legislative intent.95 
Constitutional guarantees to due process of law drive the void for vagueness 
and overbreadth doctrines by demanding that laws provide fair notice and do 
                                                 
 90  See Booms, supra note 87, at 550–51 (comparing the elements necessary to 
prove a trade secret claim under state law; CFAA claims do not require proof that the 
misappropriated data was a trade secret, just that the information came from a protected 
computer); see also Economic Espionage Act of 1996 18 U.S.C. § § 1831-39 (2006) PL 112-
269, January 14, 2013, 126 Stat. 2442. The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) was enacted in 
1996 and is the federal statute that addresses trade secret theft.  The EEA largely tracks the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (most state statutes modeled after this as well). There is no private 
right of action under the EEA. See Cooper Square Realty Inc. v. Jensen, 04-CIV.01011 
(CSH), 2005 WL 53284 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2005) (“[C]ongressional intent . . . expressly 
and unambiguously demonstrates that Congress did not establish a private cause of action in 
the EEA”). 
 91  See Winters, supra note 77 (describing the strategic benefits of bringing a trade 
secret claim under the CFAA in order to sidestep obstacles and limitations imposed under the 
Illinois Trade Secret Act). 
 92  Graham M. Liccardi, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for 
Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 155, 158–59 
(2008). Forty-seven states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) or some 
variation thereof, as the basis for its trade secret misappropriation cause of action. Id. 
 93  Greg Pollaro, Disloyal Computer Use and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: 
Narrowing the Scope, DUKE L. & TECH. REV.12, 22 (2010). 
 94  See Brenton, supra note 76, at 448–49. To be protected under a trade secret 
statute, information must be kept secret. Trade secret statutes’ heightened evidentiary 
standards reflect careful balancing between safeguarding business information and 
guaranteeing employee mobility. In contrast, any information accessible through a computer 
may be protected under the CFAA. Id. 
 95  Yule Kim, Cong. Research Serv., 97-589, Statutory Interpretation: General 
Principles and Recent Trends, at 3 (2008). 
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not significantly curtail protected activities.96 The doctrine of constitutional 
doubt requires courts to avoid constructions that pose difficult constitutional 
questions and to construe statutes constitutionally whenever possible.97 If a 
statute is susceptible to two different meanings—one constitutional and one 
unconstitutional— courts must choose the constitutional definition to save 
the statute.98  
In addition to doctrines, courts frequently rely on canons of statutory 
construction to draw inferences about the meaning of statutory language.99 
The overriding objective of statutory construction is to effectuate 
Congressional purpose.100 Even if the interpretive question involves only a 
provision of a larger statute, a court’s duty is to construe the entire statute 
sensibly.101 Briefly describing applicable doctrines and canons of statutory 
construction are necessary to appreciate why the CFAA must be narrowly 
interpreted.102 
 
A.  The Void for Vagueness Doctrine 
 
The void for vagueness doctrine, rooted in the Due Process Clause, 
insists that criminal statutes: (1) provide notice to the public of what 
behavior is prohibited, and (2) include meaningful standards to prevent 
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.103 The first prong of the void for 
                                                 
 96  See United States. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292–306 (2008) (describing the 
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines). 
 97  Almendarez-Torrez v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1998) (explaining 
that this canon is followed out of respect for Congress, which the court assumes “legislates in 
the light of constitutional limitations”); see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) 
(“[i]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional 
problems, and where an alternate interpretation of the statute is ‘fairly possible’…we are 
obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems.”). 
 98  Almendarez-Torrez, 523 U.S. at 238; see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 
(1988) (“[t]he federal courts have the duty to avoid constitutional difficulties by doing so if 
such a [narrowing] construction is fairly possible”); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124, 149 (2007) (explaining the canon of constitutional avoidance as, “[an] elementary rule . . 
. every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from 
unconstitutionality.”). 
 99  Kim, supra note 95, at 3. 
 100  See United States v. McAllister, 225 F.3d 982, 986 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining 
that courts interpret statutes to give effect to the intent of Congress); see Kim, supra note 95, 
at 3. 
 101  Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 568 (1995) (explaining the court’s duty 
to construe statutes, not isolated provisions).  
 102  Chicksaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001). Canons of statutory 
construction are not mandatory rules. They are guidelines designed to help courts determine 
Congressional intent. If other circumstances or evidence can strongly prove congressional 
intent, canons may be overcome. Additionally, some canons champion maxims that are 
incompatible with other canons, forcing a court to pick one over another. Nonetheless, when 
the language and legislative history is ambiguous, canons can provide guidance. 
 103  Kolander v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also Williams, 553 U.S. at 
306 (“[w]hat renders a statute vague is . . . the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is. 
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vagueness doctrine, the fair notice requirement, ensures that ordinary citizens 
can act in conformity with the law.104 A statute can violate due process rights 
if citizens have to guess, or vary in their understanding of, a statute’s 
meaning.105  
The second prong of the void for vagueness doctrine focuses on how 
much discretion the statute gives to the government officials enforcing it.106 
A statute must direct law enforcement officials and triers of fact in a 
predictable and equitable application of its provisions.107 A statute is 
unconstitutionally vague if its lack of guidelines could result in arbitrary or 
discriminatory enforcement.108 For example, including a mens rea 
requirement in a statute can alleviate vagueness concerns by narrowing the 
scope of a statute and limiting prosecutorial discretion.109  
A statute with language that is impermissibly vague can be saved 
through a narrow judicial interpretation.110 Once a court interprets the 
meaning of a statute, the judicial interpretation becomes part of the statute’s 
meaning.111 The canon of constitutional avoidance directs a court to save a 
                                                                                                                   
Thus, we have struck down statutes that tied criminal culpability to whether the defendant’s 
conduct was ‘annoying’ or ‘indecent’—wholly subjective judgments without statutory 
definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal meanings.”). 
 104  City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 58, n.14 (1999) (holding that an 
ordinance’s definition of loiter, “to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose,” was 
unconstitutionally vague because it drew no distinction between innocent conduct and conduct 
calculated to cause harm); see F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 
(2012).  
 105  See Fox Television Studios, 132 S.Ct. at 2317 (“[a] fundamental principle in 
our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of 
conduct that is forbidden or required.”). 
 106  Kolander, 461 U.S. at 357. 
 107  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (holding that if 
enforcement of a criminal statute can be done on an entirely subjective basis the statute is 
impermissibly vague). 
 108  Kolander, 461 U.S. at 358; see Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572–73 (1974) 
(describing the level of guidance necessary for a statute to be constitutional: it is within the 
province of the legislature, and not law enforcement, to make law, and they must fashion 
statute with enough guidance so that it is not left to the “personal predilections” of police or 
prosecutors). 
 109  Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 149–50 (concluding that the word “deliberate” in an 
abortion statute helped alleviate vagueness concerns because by ensuring that doctors 
performing abortions would not face criminal liability if they delivered a fetus beyond the 
prohibited point in good faith). 
 110  Morales, 527 at 61, n.31 (distinguishing the instant case from Boos v. Barry, 
485 U.S. 312, 329–30 (1988), “[t]here, we noted that the text of the relevant statute, read 
literally, may have been void for vagueness. . . [w]e then found, however, that the Court of 
Appeals had ‘provided a narrowing construction that alleviates. . . these difficulties’”); but see 
id. at 68–69 (if a federal court is interpreting a state statute, the federal court has no authority 
to construe the language of a state statute more narrowly than the construction given by that 
state’s highest court). 
 111  Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 23 (1973) (“[w]hen a state statute has been 
construed to forbid identifiable conduct so that ‘interpretation by (the state court) puts these 
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statute from unconstitutionality through a narrow interpretation when faced 
with the option of invalidating a statute due to vagueness or curing the 
vagueness through narrow interpretation.112   
 
B. The Overbreadth Doctrine 
 
Closely related to the void for vagueness doctrine is the doctrine of 
overbreadth.113 The overbreadth doctrine prohibits a criminal law from 
sweeping so broadly that it also encompasses constitutionally protected 
activity.114 A statute is overbroad if its language is so broad that sanctions 
apply to conduct that the government is not entitled to regulate.115 If 
impermissible applications are substantial when compared to the statute’s 
legitimate scope, the overbreadth doctrine can invalidate entire statutes.116 
Even statutes designed primarily to prohibit or target only criminal conduct 
cannot survive an overbreadth challenge if a protected right is substantially 
infringed.117 
C. The Rule of Lenity 
 
The rule of lenity is a canon of statutory construction for criminal 
statutes, but can also apply in civil contexts if the statute at issue has criminal 
and noncriminal applications.118 This “junior version of the vagueness 
doctrine” assures that citizens have fair notice by resolving any ambiguity in 
a statute to only apply to clearly covered conduct.119 The rule of lenity 
                                                                                                                   
words in the statute as definitely as if it had been so amended by the legislature,’ claims of 
impermissible vagueness must be judged in that light.”).  
 112  Boos, 485 U.S. at 330–31(finding it “well settled” that federal courts have the 
power to adopt narrowing constructions of federal legislation); see also Kerr, supra note 3, at 
1573. 
 113  See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (striking down an overly-broad 
Alabama statute against loitering or pickets outside a business). 
 114  Id. See also Galbraith, supra note 73, at 323 (noting that the contract-based 
theory has “allowed website owners to utilize the CFAA to override the carefully balanced 
provisions of the copyright laws and improperly restrict speech in violation of the First 
Amendment.”). 
 115  Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a 
law is overbroad if it prohibits not only acts the legislature may forbid, but also 
constitutionally protected conduct). 
 116  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615–16 (1973). 
 117  M. Katherine Boychuck, Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vague or 
Overbroad?, 88 NW. U.L. REV. 769, 773 (1994). 
 118  Id. Statutes with criminal and noncriminal applications still need to be 
interpreted consistently; hence, the rule of lenity may be invoked even in a civil context. 
Because the CFAA has both criminal and civil provisions, the rule of lenity may apply. See 
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (interpreting a term narrowly despite arising in a 
civil deportation case because, “we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we 
encounter its application in a criminal or a noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.”). 
 119  Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 463; see Miller, 687 F.3d at 204 (rejecting plaintiff’s 
argument in a civil CFAA claim for a broad interpretation by holding “in the interest of 
providing fair warning of ‘what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed,’ we will 
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embodies two important policies.120 First, citizens should be given fair 
warning in easily understood language of behavior that can result in criminal 
sanctions.121 Due process prevents courts from construing laws in novel or 
surprising ways by criminalizing conduct not clearly defined in a statute.122 
Second, laws with criminal penalties are a reflection of society’s 
condemnation and should be defined by legislatures, not courts.123 
Ambiguities in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of the defendant 
to both afford notice and to ensure that the boundaries of criminal statutes are 
sketched by legislatures and not courts.124 Before the rule of lenity applies, a 
court must conclude that there is serious ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
statute that normal methods of statutory construction cannot resolve.125 
Courts narrowly interpreting the CFAA frequently cite to the rule of lenity as 
a guiding principle.126  
The instruction that ambiguity of criminal statutes should be 
resolved in favor of lenity interlocks with the presumption that Congress acts 
interstitially.127 The balance between state and federal criminal jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                   
construe this criminal statute strictly and avoid interpretations not clearly warranted by the 
text”); see also Ratzlaf  v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 148 (1994) (finding that lenity 
principles demand resolution of ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant); see 
also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (determining that the touchstone for 
notice is whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at 
the relevant time that the defendant’s conduct was criminal). 
 120  United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347–48 (1971). 
 121  Id.  
 122  Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 463; see also Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134 (applying the rule 
of lenity to the CFAA because, “[t]he Supreme Court has long warned against interpreting 
criminal statutes in surprising and novel ways that impose unexpected burdens on 
defendants.”). 
 123  Bass, 404 U.S. at 347–48. 
 124  Id. at 348. 
 125  Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 64–65 (1995). If courts are unable to deduce the 
meaning of a statute after examining the statutory text and available legislative sources, then 
the rule of lenity requires construing the statute in favor of the criminal defendant. See also 
Clarity, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 1316 (explaining that because the CFAA is criminal in nature and 
ambiguous, invoking the rule of lenity is appropriate and the rule favors the less harsh version 
on the defendant); see also Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (D. Ariz. 
2008) (discussing the principles of statutory construction, specifically the rule of lenity in 
guiding the court’s interpretation of the CFAA because it has both criminal and noncriminal 
applications). 
 126  Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, 2006 WL 2683058 at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 
2006) (finding that the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” were 
ambiguous and required applying the rule of lenity to produce a restrained, narrow 
interpretation); see also ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Med., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 612 
(M.D. Tenn. 2010) (finding the CFAA unambiguous, but stating that even if the court found 
the CFAA ambiguous, the rule of lenity would require any ambiguity to be resolved in favor 
of the defendant); see also Dana Ltd. v. Am. Axle & Mfg. Holdings, Inc., 2012 WL 2524008 
at *4 (W.D. Mich. June 29, 2012) (holding that because the CFAA is primarily a criminal 
statute, the rule of lenity requires any ambiguity to be resolved in favor of the defendant). 
 127  Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (explaining that before a court 
chooses a harsher alternative, it should remember that unless Congress conveys its purpose 
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requires Congress to convey its purpose clearly if it intends for a statute to 
effect a significant change in the balance.128 Absent a clear Congressional 
purpose, courts should not interpret statutes in ways that would significantly 
change the federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes.129  
 
D. The Plain Language Rule 
 
The starting point in statutory construction is always the language of 
the statute itself. 130 The plain meaning rule states that if the language of a 
statute is clear, there is no need to look outside the statute to its legislative 
history to ascertain the meaning.131 When a statute’s language is 
unambiguous, the plain meaning rule will both start and end the judicial 
inquiry.132 This canon crystallizes interpretational priorities: statutory 
language is primary, legislative history is secondary.133 The one generally 
recognized exception to the plain language rule is that the plain meaning will 
be rejected if it would produce an absurd result.134 
When the meaning of specific statutory language is at issue, courts 
will first look to see if the statute provides a definition.135 A statutorily 
provided definition will govern if applicable in the context used.136 If the 
                                                                                                                   
clearly, the interpretation should not significantly change the federal-state balance in the 
prosecution of crimes). 
 128  Bass, 404 U.S. at 349; see also Brett Senior & Assocs. v. Fitzgerald, 2007 WL 
2043377 at *4 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding it unlikely that Congress, given its concern “about the 
appropriate scope of Federal jurisdiction” in the area of computer crime, intended essentially 
to criminalize state-law beaches of contract) (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3 (1986)). 
 129  Bass, 404 U.S. at 349; see also Shamrock, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 966 (“such rule 
requires a court confronted with two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than 
the other, to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite 
language.”). 
 130 McAllister, 225 F.3d at 986 (explaining that the starting point in interpreting a 
statute is always the language of the statute itself); see, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 
U.S. 337, 340–41 (1997) (determining whether the language at issue has a plain and 
unambiguous meaning by looking “to the language itself, the specific context in which that 
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”). 
 131  United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997) (finding that the 
straightforward language of the statute left no reason to resort to legislative history). 
 132  Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 147–48 (“[w]e do not resort of legislative history to cloud a 
statutory text that is clear.”). 
 133  Kim, supra note 95, at 41. 
 134  See, e.g., United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 47 n.5 (1994) (dismissing 
an interpretation said to lead to an absurd result); see also Public Citizen v. Department of 
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (“[w]here the literal reading of a statutory term would 
compel an ‘odd result’. . . we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend 
the term its proper scope.”). 
 135  Kim, supra note 95, at 5; see Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979). 
 136  Kim, supra note 95, at 5; see also Orbit One Commc'ns, Inc. v. Numerex 
Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 373, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (rejecting a broad interpretation of the 
CFAA because it would be imprudent to interpret the CFAA in a manner inconsistent with its 
plain meaning and to transform the common law civil tort of misappropriation of confidential 
information into a criminal offense). 
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statute does not define the word but has an accepted meaning in the area of 
law addressed by the statute, the court will import the meaning from the 
whole term and not break down the component parts.137 Words that are not 
defined and are not terms of art are customarily given their ordinary 
meanings, which are often derived from the dictionary.138 
 
E. No “Mere Surplusage” 
 
Congress acts purposefully in enacting and amending statutes.139 
Courts should presume that Congress intended each of a statute’s terms to 
have meaning, and courts should give effect, if possible, to every clause and 
word of a statute.140 Courts should avoid any interpretation that insinuates 
that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it 
employed.141 When Congress amends a statute by altering words, it does so 
with the intent of changing the statute’s meaning.142 Prudentially, the 
converse of this rule creates a corollary canon: courts should not add 
language that Congress has not included.143 On a slightly broader scale, this 
construction principle also applies to statutes as they stand in relation to each 
other. Congress will not enact duplicative statutes, so where other federal 
statutes would apply, the statute at issue should not.144 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 137  Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 483 (1990) (“where a phrase in a statute 
appears to have become a term of art . . . any attempt to break down the term into its 
constituent words is not apt to illuminate its meaning.”). 
 138  F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (explaining that in the absence of 
a statutory definition, “we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural 
meaning”); see also Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 459 (finding that “[m]ost courts that have actually 
considered the issue of the meaning of the word ‘access’ in the CFAA have basically turned to 
the dictionary meaning.”).  
 139  Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (quoting Ratzlaf v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 135, 140–41 (1994) (“[j]udges should hestitate….to treat [as surplusage] 
statutory terms in any setting, and resistance should be heightened when the words describe an 
element of a criminal offense.”). 
 140  Id. at 146 (rejecting interpretation that would have made “uses” and “carries” 
redundant in statute penalizing using or carrying a firearm in commission of an offense 
because, “[w]e assume that Congress used two terms because it intended each term to have a 
particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”). 
 141  Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (finding that a court has the 
duty, if possible, to avoid any construction of a statute “which implies that the legislature was 
ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.”). 
 142  Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (stating that when Congress acts to 
amend a statute, “we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.”). 
 143  Kim, supra note 95, at 13. 
 144  Id. at 13–14.  
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F. The Canon of Consistency 
 
Avoiding due process concerns requires courts to interpret statutes 
with criminal and non-criminal applications consistently.145 Additionally, a 
term or phrase appearing in several places in a statute should be interpreted 
with the same meaning each time it appears.146 This construction principle 
should be employed when interpreting the CFAA as the statute not only has 
both criminal and civil applications, but repeats the same terms (“without 
authorization” and “exceeds authorized access”) in several subsections.147 
This canon of construction means that once a court interprets a term or 
provision of the CFAA, that definition will govern all future CFAA cases in 
the jurisdiction.148 Courts defining “authorization” in the context of a 
business dispute concerning monetary damages should be mindful that the 
decided definition will govern with equal force to a dispute involving 
criminal punishment.149 
 
IV.  THE CURRENT SPLIT 
 
A court’s interpretation of the CFAA dramatically affects whether an 
employee is liable for misusing information gained from company 
                                                 
 145  See, e.g., United States v. Bigham, 812 F.2d 943, 948 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting 
that when Congress allows the same standard to govern criminal and civil cases, it is “of no 
significance . . . [w]hether a case is brought on the civil or criminal side of the docket.”). 
 146  Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 143; see also Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 
551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007) (stating that “identical words and phrases within the same statute 
should normally be given the same meaning.”). 
 147  Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 143; Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859. Rejecting the government’s 
suggestion that the court adopt the government’s proposed definition of “exceeds authorized 
access” for the subsection at issue, and still use narrower interpretations for the other times it 
is used in the statute because that result would be inconsistent. Noting that because the phrase 
“exceeds authorized access” appears five times in the first seven subsections of the CFAA, the 
court must consider how its adopted interpretation will operate wherever the phrase appears. 
Id. 
 148  Bigham, 812 F.2d at 948; see Hernacki, supra note 82, at 1548. The mens rea 
requirements vary within the provisions of the CFAA, but the actus reas usually involves 
either or both of the terms “without authorization” or “exceeds authorized access.” For 
example, the fraud provision of the CFAA requires both intent to defraud and violative access 
that furthers the intended fraud; in contrast, another provision requires no mens rea and only 
violative access is required. In a case of first impression, if the court is dealing with the fraud 
provision in a civil case where the defendant has committed obvious wrongdoing, a broad 
interpretation of the term “unauthorized access” may make sense. However, this definition 
will carry over to all other CFAA cases. The definition which fit naturally in the context it was 
made may not be similarly appropriate if the next case consists of criminal liability and no 
wrongdoing.  
 149  See Kerr, supra note 26, at 1641–42 (noting that courts are more likely to hold 
a defendant liable under an ambiguous statute when the stakes involve a business dispute 
between competitors than when government seeks to impose jail time on an individual. The 
problem becomes, these same definitions are then used in criminal settings where it is jail 
time, and not money damages, at stake.). 
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computers.150 There are three primary ways that federal courts interpret the 
term “authorization.”151 Two of these interpretations are broad, focusing on 
the intent of the employee to determine whether the employee’s actions 
furthered or frustrated the interests of the employer.152 Courts following a 
broad, agency-based interpretation use principles of agency law and hold that 
authorization terminates whenever an employee acts against his employer’s 
interests.153 Courts endorsing the other broad view analyze authorization by 
examining underlying contractual obligations and company policies.154 In 
contrast, the third approach takes a considerably more restrained view.155 
Instead of examining the employee’s subjective intent, this narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA focuses objectively on whether the employer 
granted authorization to the employee.156 
  
A. The Broad View of Agency Theory 
 
The Seventh Circuit applies a broad view of agency theory that, 
grounded in principles of agency law, is the most employer-friendly 
interpretation of the CFAA.157 This approach examines the status of an 
agency relationship between an employer and employee to determine 
whether access to a computer was authorized.158 Under an employer-
employee agency relationship, an employee owes a special duty of loyalty to 
his employer which requires him to act solely for the benefit of the 
employer.159 An employee has “authorization” under the CFAA as long as 
his work furthers the interests of his employer.160 Once an employee acts 
                                                 
 150  Audra A. Dial & John M. Moye, Fourth Circuit Widens Split Over CFAA and 
Employees Violating Computer Use Restrictions, 17 No. 11 CYBERSPACE LAW 1 (2012).  
 151  See generally Kerr, supra note 26. Reacting to the courts inconsistent treatment 
of the CFAA, Professor Orin Kerr has proposed an alternate approach: the code-based 
approach.  Under this view, access to a protected computer is unauthorized when a user 
circumvents a firewall or username/login screen to access the system. Id. While this approach 
has been extensively analyzed by commentators, it has not been expressly adopted by courts. 
Because this Comment analyzes how the CFAA has been treated in courts, the code-based 
approach falls outside the scope of this Comment. See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 460 (determining 
that “[i]t is simply noted that, while defining “access” in terms of a code-based restriction 
might arguably be a preferable approach, no case has adopted it, and the CFAA legislative 
history does not support it.”). 
 152  Kapitanyan, supra note 80, at 433–34. To determine whether the employee’s 
conduct was authorized or not, the broad view focuses on the employee’s intent, whereas the 
narrow view focuses on the actions of the employer. Id. 
 153  Citrin, 440 F.3d at 421. 
 154  Explorica, 274 F.3d at 577. See generally Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1127. 
 155  Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1127. 
 156  Id. 
 157  Field, supra note 48. 
 158  Citrin, 440 F.3d at 418. 
 159  Field, supra note 48, at 823. 
 160  See Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 39 (1958) (stating that the agent is to 
act only for the principal’s benefit). 
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adversely to his employer’s interest, both the agency relationship and 
authorization under the CFAA immediately terminate.161  
An agency interpretation of the CFAA requires no affirmative 
employer action for authorization to terminate.162 Authorization is implicitly 
revoked whenever an employee accesses a computer for purposes that do not 
further his employer’s interest.163 Focusing entirely on the employee’s state 
of mind, all it takes to terminate authorization and incur liability under this 
view of the CFAA is an employee action not wholly in the employer’s best 
interests. 164 An employee acts “without authorization” under the CFAA 
when he breaches a state law duty of loyalty or fiduciary duty to the 
employer.165  
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. 
Citrin is generally heralded as the leading case for an agency-based 
interpretation of the CFAA, though the case was largely based on a district 
case decided a few years earlier.166 Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. 
Safeguard Self Storage, Inc. was the first case to apply an agency theory of 
authorization to a CFAA claim addressing the exploits of a rogue 
employee.167 Both companies in the self-storage business, Shurgard was an 
established industry leader while Safeguard had recently entered the market 
as a direct competitor.168 Safeguard approached one of Shurgard’s regional 
managers, Eric Leland, and offered him a position with their company.169 
While employed with Shurgard and in breach of his employment agreement, 
Leland used his employee access to email confidential and proprietary 
information to Safeguard representatives.170 Leland continued to supply 
Safeguard with this type of information even after leaving Shurgard.171 
                                                 
 161  Field, supra note 48, at 823 (asserting that once an employee terminates the 
agency relationship by acting adversely to his employer’s interests, he is also acting “without 
authorization” since authorization is a privilege tied inextricably to the agency relationship). 
 162  Restatement (Second) of Agency § 112 (1958) (“[u]nless otherwise agreed, the 
authority of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse 
interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal”); see also 
Kaplan, supra note 14. 
 163  Restatement (Second) of Agency § 112 (1958). 
 164  Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21; see also Shawn E. Tuma, “What Does CFAA Mean 
and Why Should I Care?” A Primer on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for Civil 
Litigators, 63 S. C. L. REV. 141, 176 (2011) (explaining how the agency theory relates to other 
interpretations of “without authorization”); see Urban, supra note 47, at 1399. 
 165  Field, supra note 48, at 823–24 (discussing the evolution of the agency-based 
theory as a direct application of agency law to interpret authorization under the CFAA). 
 166  Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc. 119 F. Supp. 2d 
1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (this case has since been overruled by LVRC Holdings v. Brekka, 
581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 167  Kapitanyan, supra note 80, at 417. 
 168  Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. 
 171  Id. at 1122.  
24
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss1/5
2013] COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 105 
 
Shurgard subsequently sued Safeguard for a litany of state tort claims as well 
as violations of the CFAA.172  
Applying the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency, the court concluded that because Leland’s authorization terminated 
when his interests became adverse to Shurgard, he was without authorization 
when he obtained and sent the confidential information to Safeguard.173 Once 
the court determined that Leland was “without authorization,” it found no 
need to decide whether Leland had also “exceeded authorized use” under the 
CFAA since liability was established with proof of either term under the 
subsection alleged.174 Reaching its conclusion based solely on the plain 
language of the statute, the court went on to cite additional support from the 
CFAA’s legislative history.175 Noting the narrowness of the original CFAA’s 
scope, the court concluded that subsequent amendments evinced clear 
congressional intent to widen coverage to cover the type of misuse alleged 
by Shurgard.176  
Citing Shurgard as authority, the Seventh Circuit officially adopted 
the agency theory in 2006.177 In Citrin the employee breached his 
employment contract with International Airport Centers (IAC) by quitting his 
job to start a competing company.178 Before returning IAC’s company 
laptop, Citrin deleted all of the data by installing a secure-erasure program to 
guarantee the data would not be recoverable.179 IAC sued Citrin, alleging he 
violated the CFAA by knowingly and intentionally causing damage to a 
protected computer without authorization.180 
Analyzing Citrin’s actions under principles of agency law, the court 
found that he unilaterally terminated his agency relationship with IAC the 
moment he resolved to quit and delete the files.181 Citrin’s authorization to 
access the laptop was inextricably tied to his agency status; without agency 
                                                 
 172  Id. In addition to the CFAA claims, Shurgard brought state law claims alleging 
misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, unfair competition, and tortious interference 
with a business expectancy. Id. 
 173  Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 (holding that, based on the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency, § 112 (1958), authority of employee ended when employee became an 
agent for a competing company. Once an employee’s authority ends, he or she loses any prior 
authorization.). 
 174  Id. at 1125 n.4. 
 175  Id. at 1127 (analyzing the CFAA’s legislative history to ensure that the court’s 
finding would not produce an absurd result). 
 176  Id. The court rejected Safeguard’s argument that the CFAA was limited to 
large-scale, industry and government computers whose information could severely harm the 
public if the information was damaged. Id. The court found the Senate report’s emphasis on 
the purpose of the CFAA to prevent individuals from abusing their right to use a computer 
demonstrated that a broad meaning was appropriate. 
 177  Citrin, 440 F.3d at 421 (establishing that an employee acts without 
authorization for purposes of the CFAA when his intentions become adverse to his employer). 
 178  Id. 
 179  Id. 
 180  Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A). 
 181  Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419. 
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status he had no authority to access the computer.182 The court held Citrin 
liable even though he was still an employee when he accessed the laptop and 
was not violating any company policies prohibiting him from deleting 
emails.183 Acknowledging that under an agency view of the CFAA the 
difference between the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds 
authorized access” is “paper thin…but not quite invisible,” the court quickly 
concluded that the principles of agency law rendered Citrin’s actions 
“without authorization.”184 
 
B. The Broad View of Contract Theory 
 
The other broad interpretation of the CFAA finds its roots in contract 
law, focusing on the contractual relationship between the parties.185 The 
First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits use underlying contractual agreements and 
employee policies as the basis for analyzing authorization.186 Liability under 
the CFAA may attach if a court finds that an employee accessed a protected 
computer in a way that was prohibited or in excess of limitations set by a 
contract or a clearly communicated employer policy.187  
The First Circuit articulated this contract approach in EF Cultural 
Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc. by finding that an employment agreement could 
establish the parameters of authorized access under the CFAA.188 EF 
Cultural Travel BV (EF), a well-established company, sued a newly-formed 
competitor company Explorica after discovering that Explorica had created a 
robot “scraper” to mine EF’s website and undercut EF’s prices.189 
Explorica’s vice president Philip Gormley was a former vice president at 
EF.190 Gormley voluntarily signed a confidentiality agreement that prohibited 
disclosure of any information “which might reasonably be construed to be 
contrary to the interests of EF” while employed with EF.191 In his new 
position with Explorica, Gormley used his intimate knowledge of EF’s 
business practices to direct the design of the computer scraper that was used 
to gather enough information to undercut EF’s prices.192  
The First Circuit held that Gormley’s use of the scraper “exceeded 
authorized access” under the CFAA because its use breached the 
                                                 
 182  Id. at 420–21. Violating the duty of loyalty, or failing to disclose adverse 
interests, voids the agency relationship. 
 183  Id. 
 184  Id. at 420. 
 185  Urban, supra note 47, at 1378. 
 186  Id. at 1372. 
 187  Id.  
 188  Explorica, 274 F.3d at 578–79. 
 189  Id. at 580. 
 190  Id. at 582. 
 191  Id. 
 192  Id. at 579–80. 
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confidentiality agreement that Gormley signed with EF.193 The court 
reasoned that Gormley acted contrary to EF’s interests in violation of the 
confidentiality agreement when he used his insider knowledge of EF’s 
business practices to the advantage of a competitor.194 Once the First Circuit 
decided that Gormley exceeded his authorized access, it declined to examine 
whether he was also “without authorization” since the predicate claim 
required only one of the two terms.195  
Starting from a contract-based interpretation of the CFAA, the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits extended the principles of contract law to base liability 
on employer policies that had been communicated to employees.196 The Fifth 
Circuit reached this conclusion in U.S. v. John, a criminal case involving 
fraud.197 Defendant John had authorization to access customer account 
information as an account manager for Citibank.198 John attended trainings 
and was aware of the corporate policy prohibiting misuse of Citigroup’s 
computer information and confidential customer information.199 
Disregarding these policies, John accessed Citigroup’s computer system to 
obtain confidential customer information which she then provided to others 
who used the information to make fraudulent charges.200 The court held that 
John exceeded her authorized access by violating Citibank’s clearly 
communicated and well-established policies that prohibited accessing 
customer data in furtherance of a criminally fraudulent scheme.201 
Acknowledging the Ninth Circuit’s contrary holding in LVRC Holdings, LLC 
v. Brekka, the Fifth Circuit explained the lack of notice issue predominant in 
Brekka was not at issue for John because she had reason to know that 
accessing data in furtherance of fraud was unauthorized.202 
                                                 
 193  Id. at 581–82. 
 194  Explorica, 274 F.3d. at 582–83 (stating that “[a]ppellants would face an uphill 
battle trying to argue that it was not against EF’s interests for appellants to use the tour codes 
to mine EF’s pricing data.”). 
 195  Id. at 581 (concluding that because the defendant “exceeded authorized 
access,” the court  did not need to reach the more general arguments made about statutory 
meaning, including whether use of a scraper alone renders access unauthorized). 
 196  United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 2010); see also United States 
v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 197  John, 597 F.3d at 269. 
 198  Id. at 273. 
 199  Id.  
 200  Id. 
 201  Id. Despite stating, “while we do not necessarily agree that violating a 
confidentiality agreement under circumstances such as those in EF Cultural Travel BV would 
give rise to criminal culpability . . .” the court found that John knew that her access in 
furtherance of a criminally fraudulent scheme was outside her permitted access. Id. 
 202  Id. at 273–74. The Ninth Circuit was primarily concerned that unless an 
employer affirmatively rescinded computer access, an employee would have no reason to 
know that personal use of a company computer would constitute a criminal violation. The 
Fifth Circuit concluded notice was not an issue in this case because John had reason to know 
that accessing company data to further a criminal act could incur criminal liability. Id. 
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The Eleventh Circuit adopted the broad, contract-based 
interpretation of the CFAA in United States v. Rodriguez.203 Rodriguez was 
charged with intentionally accessing a computer without authorization or 
exceeding authorized access, and obtaining information from a department or 
agency of the United States.204 While working for the Social Security 
Administration (Administration), Rodriguez repeatedly accessed multiple 
non-business related accounts despite a clearly-stated employer policy 
prohibiting non-business use of company computers.205 This policy warned 
employees that they faced criminal penalties if they violated policies on 
authorized use of databases.206 Although Rodriguez refused to sign a written 
acknowledgement of the policy, he attended mandatory office trainings and 
received office memorandums and daily alerts on company computers that 
all served to reinforce the policy.207 Examining the plain language of the 
CFAA and the Administration’s policies, the court ultimately concluded that 
even though there was no formal written agreement in place, accessing 
information in violation of a corporate computer-use policy equated to 
“exceeding authorized access” under the CFAA.208  
Courts have also applied a contract-based approach to cover network 
service provider agreements.209 Under this application of a contract-based 
theory, once someone uses a computer in a way that violates his contract 
with the provider, he has “exceeded his authorized use” and is in violation of 
the CFAA.210 Applying this approach to terms of service agreements allows 
website owners and service providers to establish criminal liability through 
terms of service.211 These terms of service cases appear to hold that a 
provider has subjective and nearly total power to decide which types of 
access constitute unauthorized access with respect to data available to the 
public through the internet.212 Allowing criminal liability to hinge on terms 
of service agreements that are rarely read, difficult to comprehend, and 
                                                 
 203  Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260. 
 204  Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B). This less-
frequently invoked CFAA provision applied because Rodriguez’s employer was the Social 
Security Administration, which is a government agency. 
 205  Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263. 
 206  Id. at 1260. 
 207  Id.  
 208  Id. 
 209  See e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 252–53 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding defendant company acted without authorization when it violated 
posted restrictions, terms of use, on plaintiff’s website); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, 
Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that LCGM’s use of AOL to send bulk-
emails in violation of AOL’s terms of service constituted access in excess of authorization). 
 210  See Hernacki, supra note 82, at 1555. 
 211  See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1582. 
 212  See Winn, supra note 30, at 1411–12. 
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subject to change without notice led one district court to declare the CFAA 
unconstitutionally vague.213  
In United States v. Drew, the court overturned the defendant’s 
misdemeanor CFAA conviction after a jury acquitted her of the felony 
CFAA charges.214 The court denied Drew’s original motion to dismiss the 
felony CFAA charges finding the scienter element in the felony provision 
saved the statute’s constitutionality.215 However, once the felony charge 
disappeared, the court concluded that the CFAA’s misdemeanor provision 
failed both prongs of the void for vagueness doctrine, and due process could 
not be afforded to citizens if every breach of a terms of service provision 
could be criminally actionable.216 
 
C. The Narrow View of the CFAA 
 
Under a narrow view of the CFAA, accessing data without 
authorization occurs only when initial access is not permitted because misuse 
of information is not within the statute’s scope.217 Once an employee is 
granted authorization to access an employer’s computer, that employee does 
not violate the CFAA regardless of how he or she subsequently uses the 
data.218 The narrow view determines whether authorization existed by 
looking solely at the actions of the employer, whereas the broad views 
examine the employee’s motives.219  
                                                 
 213  Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 449 (overturning misdemeanor conviction under CFAA 
based on defendant exceeding the scope of authorized access as defined by MySpace’s terms 
of service agreement); see also David A. Puckett, Terms of Service and the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act: A Trap for the Unwary?, 7 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 53 (2011) (dividing terms of 
service agreements into four categories to demonstrate different practical and constitutional 
problems when applied to CFAA claims: wholly unexpected terms of service, utterly vague 
terms of service, spectacularly complex terms of service, and terms of service that abut First 
Amendment freedoms). 
 214  Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 451. 
 215  Id. The scienter element present in the 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii) felony 
charge is the requirement that the accessing of a computer without authorization is intentional. 
 216  Id. at 464. Anyone who uses a computer connected to the internet and views 
information has already met two of the three elements to § 1030(a)(2)(C). The third element 
requires intentionally accessing the computer’s information either without authorization or by 
exceeding authorized access. Concluding that it would be unconstitutional to hold every 
person who intentionally violates a terms of service agreement criminally liable, the court held 
that the defendant’s CFAA misdemeanor conviction was unconstitutionally vague. The court 
found that the CFAA provision violated both prongs of the void for vagueness doctrine due to 
the lack of minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement and due to deficiencies in notice 
which meant that people of “common intelligence” would not be on notice that a breach of a 
terms of service agreement can bring criminal charges. Id. 
 217  Kapitanyan, supra note 80, at 426. 
 218  Federal Judge Highlights Dissention Over Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
CIRCUIT SPLIT BLOG (May 22, 2012) http://www.circuitsplits.com/2012/05/ federal-judge-
highlights-dissension-over-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act.html. 
 219  See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860. 
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In a severe departure from broad views, the Ninth Circuit adopted a 
narrow interpretation of the CFAA in Brekka and used the recent case U.S v. 
Nosal to reaffirm its position.220 This unflinchingly narrow interpretation has 
quickly picked up steam, garnering support from several other circuits and 
numerous district courts.221  
In Brekka, LVRC brought several state tort claims and a CFAA 
claim against former employee Christopher Brekka.222 Alleging that Brekka 
emailed LVRC files to his personal account without authorization, LVRC 
argued Brekka was either without authorization, or exceeded his authorized 
access, the moment he decided to use the computer in a way adverse to his 
employer’s interest.223 Invoking several canons of statutory construction, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Brekka, holding that 
he did not violate the CFAA.224 
First, without a statutory definition for “authorization,” the court 
consulted a dictionary to determine the ordinary, common meaning of the 
word.225 Defining authorization to mean permission, the court concluded that 
because LVRC gave Brekka permission to use the company computer, he 
had authorization to access company files.226 Next, the court examined the 
plain language of the statute for any evidence to support LVRC’s argument 
that Congress implied an agency relationship, but found none.227 Entirely 
                                                 
 220  Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1127; see also Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863–64. 
 221  See infra note 246 (summarizing district courts that use a narrow interpretation 
of the CFAA). 
 222  Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129. Plaintiffs alleged that Brekka accessed LVRC’s 
computers during both his employment with LVRC and after he left the company. Finding 
that LVRC failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Brekka accessed 
the LVRC website without authorization after he left the company, the court focused on 
Brekka’s authorization during the time he was employed with plaintiff. 
 223  Id. LVRC was limited to the agency theory since Brekka did not have a written 
employment agreement, nor did LVRC promulgate employee guidelines that would prohibit 
employees from emailing LVRC documents to personal computers. 
 224  Id. at 1135. 
 225  Id. at 1132–33 (applying the fundamental canon of statutory construction to 
define “without authorization.” Unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking 
their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.). 
 226  Id. at 1133. See also Lockheed, 2006 WL 2683058 at *5 (M.D. Fla. 2006). The 
court explained the difference between the two terms “without authorization” and “exceeds 
authorized access” under a narrow interpretation of the CFAA: 
[T]hus it is plain from the outset that Congress singled out two groups of 
accessers, those ‘without authorization’ (or those below authorization, 
meaning those having no permission to access whatsoever—typically 
outsiders, as well as insiders that are not permitted any computer access) 
and those exceeding authorization (or those above authorization, meaning 
those that go beyond the permitted access granted to them—typically 
insiders exceeding whatever access is permitted to them). 
Id. 
 227  Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135 (rejecting an agency interpretation because, 
“[N]othing in the CFAA suggests that a defendant’s liability for accessing a computer without 
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unpersuaded by LVRC’s Citrin line of reasoning, the court decided that the 
plain language, canon of consistency, and the rule of lenity all pointed 
strongly to a narrow interpretation where authorization depends on actions 
taken by the employer and not the employee.228 The court reasoned that 
narrowly interpreting the CFAA was necessary in order to avoid interpreting 
a criminal statute in a surprising or unexpected way.229 
In the recent criminal case U.S. v. Nosal, the Ninth Circuit 
reaffirmed its holding in Brekka by not only denouncing broad 
interpretations of the CFAA, but urging circuit courts applying broad 
interpretations to reconsider.230 After Nosal left his job at Korn/Ferry, he 
convinced current Korn/Ferry employees to use their authorized log-in 
information to steal information for use in Nosal’s new business venture.231 
The government charged Nosal and his co-conspirators with numerous 
CFAA counts.232  
Declaring that the CFAA failed to provide a remedy for 
misappropriated information where authorization by the employer had not 
been rescinded, the court held that Nosal’s co-conspirators did not violate the 
CFAA when they retrieved confidential information through company use 
accounts.233 The court rejected the government’s proposed broad reading of 
the CFAA, finding a broad interpretation would transform the CFAA “from 
an anti-hacking statute into an expansive misappropriation statute.” 234 The 
court countered the government’s interpretation by reasoning, “[I]f Congress 
meant to expand the scope of criminal liability to everyone who uses a 
computer in violation of computer use restrictions—which may well include 
everyone who uses a computer—we would expect it to use language better 
                                                                                                                   
authorization turns on whether the defendant breached a state law duty of loyalty to an 
employer.”). 
 228  Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129–35. First, the court engaged in a plain language 
reading of the statute, construing the term “without authorization” to mean “without 
permission.” Explicitly rejecting the agency theory because it essentially equates the terms 
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access,” the court explained that because 
Congress included two separate phrases, the only way one would not be rendered meaningless 
is if it meant different things. Lastly, the court concluded that the agency theory also violated 
of the rule of lenity, which requires courts to limit the reach of criminal statutes to the clear 
import of their text and construe any ambiguity against the government. Id. 
 229  Id. at 1135. If the employer has not rescinded the defendant’s right to use the 
computer, the defendant would have no reason to know that making personal use of the 
company computer in breach of a state law fiduciary duty to an employer would constitute a 
criminal violation of the CFAA. 
 230  Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862. 
 231  Id. at 856 (explaining that Korn/Ferry employees had authorization to access 
the database, but Korn/Ferry had a policy forbidding disclosing confidential information). 
 232  Id. at 856.  
 233  Id. at 863–64 (finding that the plain language of the CFAA expressly prohibits 
improper access of computer information; it does not prohibit misuse or misappropriation). 
 234  Id. at 857. 
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suited to that purpose.”235 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found no evidence 
in either the statutory language or history of the CFAA to indicate an 
intentional displacement of the traditional state tort and contract laws 
typically governing employer-employee relationships.236 Unimpressed by the 
broad interpretations’ willingness to hang criminal liability on violations of 
private computer use policies, the court found the implications appallingly 
unconstitutional, and used canons of statutory construction and the rule of 
lenity to settle on its narrow holding.237 Countering the dissent’s claim that 
the majority’s feared “parade of horribles” was unfounded, the court cited to 
a recent Florida district court case that involved a CFAA claim based on an 
employee’s personal use of a company computer.238 
The Fourth Circuit recently staked its claim on the narrow side of the 
split when it decided WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC v. Miller.239 The 
court held that an employee does not violate the CFAA by downloading 
confidential information later used in a competing business if, at the time the 
information is downloaded, the employee was authorized to access the 
system.240 Conscious of the canon of consistency and the statute’s criminal 
provisions, the court examined the plain language and construed the statute 
strictly to avoid an unanticipated or surprising result.241 The court explicitly 
                                                 
 235  Id. (citing the presumption that Congress acts interstitially; unless Congress 
conveys its purpose clearly, a statute will not be deemed to have significantly changed the 
federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes). 
 236   Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860 (explaining that employer-employee and company-
consumer relationships are traditionally governed by tort and contract law and that the 
government’s proposed interpretation would unacceptably allow private parties to manipulate 
computer use and employment policies into a basis for criminal law). 
 237  Id. at 856–64. Deciding that a broad reading of the CFAA would render it 
unconstitutional for a myriad of reasons; primarily lack of notice. “Millions of unsuspecting 
individuals would find that they are engaging in criminal conduct.” Id. It is impermissible to 
allow employers to base criminal liability in what would otherwise be, at most a state tort or 
contract claim. This could transform whole categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into 
federal crimes simply because a computer is involved. 
 238  Id. at n.6 The Nosal majority cited Lee v. PMSI, Inc., No. 8:10 CV 2904 T 
23TBM, 2011 WL 1742028 (M.D. Fla. May 6, 2011), as an example of the type of 
unacceptable claims that could come from a broad interpretation of the CFAA. Id. In Lee, an 
employer counterclaimed against an employee’s wrongful termination suit. The counterclaim 
alleged that the employee violated the CFAA when she used a company computer for personal 
reasons like accessing Facebook and sending personal emails, in violation of a computer-use 
policy. Although the district court dismissed the claim, the Nosal majority noted that, “it could 
not have done so if ‘exceeds authorized access’ included violations of private computer use 
policies.” Id. 
 239  Miller, 687 F.3d at 204 (originally plaintiff brought one CFAA claim and nine 
state law claims to the district court, alleging that defendant had breached his employment 
agreement by using company information for a competitive purpose. When the district court 
dismissed the CFAA count for failure to state a claim, it declined to exercise jurisdiction over 
the remaining state law claims. In a footnote, the court described nine alternative available 
state law remedies that remained available for plaintiffs.). 
 240  Id. 
 241  Id. at 207.  
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rejected the agency and contract views, finding both theories not only 
contravene Congressional purpose, but are also unnecessary since state law 
remedies already exist.242  
The Sixth Circuit relied heavily on the Brekka court’s interpretation 
of the term “authorization” in Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers’ International 
Union of North America.243 The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s 
complaint citing Brekka as persuasive authority.244 The decision strongly 
suggests the Sixth Circuit would choose a narrow interpretation of the CFAA 
as it found the defendants’ use of public communication systems to contact 
the plaintiffs defeated allegations that the access was “without 
authorization.”245 Meanwhile, numerous district courts within the Sixth 
Circuit have openly embraced the narrow view.246  
 
 
                                                                                                                   
Our conclusion here likely will disappoint employers hoping for a means 
to rein in rogue employees. But we are unwilling to contravene 
Congress’s intent by transforming a statute meant to target hackers into a 
vehicle for imputing liability to workers who access computers . . . in bad 
faith, or who disregard a use policy. . . Providing such recourse not only is 
unnecessary . . . but is violative of the Supreme Court’s counsel to 
construe criminal statutes strictly. 
Id. 
 242  Id. at 206 (describing the deficiencies of an agency theory: “[S]uch a rule 
would mean that any employee who checked the latest Facebook posting or sporting event 
scores in contravention of his employer’s use policy would be subject to the instantaneous 
cessation of his agency and, as a result, would be left without any authorization to access his 
employer’s computer systems.”). 
 243  Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 648 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 
2011) (holding that the defendant had not accessed information without authorization under 
the CFAA because plaintiff’s information was open to the public and did not need 
authorization to access). 
 244  Id. at 307.  
 245  Id. The heavy reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the 
CFAA suggests that if the Sixth Circuit ever squarely addresses the meaning of “without 
authorization” in an employment dispute, it would adopt a narrow view. 
 246  See Dana, 2012 WL 2524008 at *5 (W.D. Mich. June 29, 2012) (holding that 
there was no violation of the CFAA because defendants were still employed with Dana Ltd at 
the time they downloaded company information which they subsequently took with them to 
work for a competitor, they were authorized to access the information in question); see e.g. 
Ajuba, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 687 (holding that allegations that an employee lost any 
authorization he had to access the employer’s computers, or, exceeded his authorization when 
he accessed the computers in violation of confidentiality and use limitations, failed to state a 
claim under the CFAA); see e.g. ReMedPar, 683 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (construing “without 
authorization” narrowly, and dismissing CFAA claim based on use of information that 
employee was authorized to obtain in a fashion that was adverse to the employer’s interests); 
see e.g. Black & Decker, Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 934–35 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) 
(rejecting Citrin’s agency analysis, and dismissing the CFAA claim that was based not on the 
employee’s accessing of information, but on his later misuse of the information, holding 
“[C]ongress did not intend to create a private cause of action against employees whose crime . 
. .  merely involved the use of ordinary email in a manner disloyal to their employer and in 
breach of their employment contract.”). 
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V.  ANALYSIS 
 
Broad interpretations of the CFAA miss the mark in just about every 
possible way.247 Agency and contract-based interpretations raise serious 
constitutional concerns and demolish Congress’s intended scope by turning 
an objective access statute into a series of murky subjective inquiries.248 
Broad interpretations disregard established canons of statutory construction 
and produce unexpected results not in accordance with Congressional intent 
or due process.249 Additionally, broad interpretations fail to restrict the 
CFAA to the types of crime intended by Congress.250 Adjudicating claims 
outside the intended scope disrupts Congress’s delicate federal-state balance 
and undermines traditional state powers.251  
A narrow interpretation is the only way to ensure that the CFAA 
remains constitutional and avoids surprising results.252 Following well-
established canons of constructions, narrow interpretations comprehensively 
define the statute’s terms to provide notice to employees and guidelines for 
enforcement.253 Narrow interpretations also effectuate Congressional intent 
by restricting the CFAA to types of claims not found in other statutes and 
leaving existing state laws undisturbed.254 The CFAA requires a narrow 
interpretation.255 
 
 
                                                 
 247  See generally infra Part V (explaining how broad interpretations are 
unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, do not follow canons of statutory construction, do not 
effectuate Congressional intent, raise federalism concerns, and overstep Congressional spheres 
of lawmaking, and onto traditional state powers). 
 248  See infra Part V.A–B (arguing broad interpretations render the CFAA 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad). 
 249  See supra Part II.A, Parts IV.A–B (comparing the actual purpose for the CFAA 
to fight new types of computer misuse crimes with broad interpretations’ application of the 
statute to address employee misappropriation). 
 250  See supra Part II.A, Part IV.A–B (comparing the type of crime Congress 
intended to target with the CFAA to the types of crimes adjudicated under agency and 
contract-based interpretations of the statute). 
 251  See supra Part II.A, infra Part V.D–E (comparing Congress’s carefully 
restricted scope of the CFAA with broad interpretations’ expansive reach which overlaps 
hugely with traditional state laws Congress meant to leave undisturbed). 
 252  See supra Part III.A–B, infra Part V (explaining requirements that all criminal 
statutes must meet in order be constitutional and demonstrating that while broad 
interpretations fall short, a narrowly interpreted CFAA remains constitutional). 
 253  See infra Part V.A–C (showing how selected canons of statutory construction 
lead to a narrow interpretation, which, in turn meets the constitutional requirements for the 
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines). 
 254  See supra note 47, infra Part V.D (explaining the CFAA’s purpose as a gap-
filler statute and demonstrating how broad interpretations inappropriately allow claims already 
addressed by existing state laws).  
 255  See infra Parts V–VI (concluding a narrow interpretation is necessary to 
effectuate Congressional intent and keep the statute constitutional).  
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A. The Void for Vagueness Doctrine Requires a Narrow Interpretation of 
the CFAA 
 
Broad interpretations of the CFAA are unconstitutionally vague.256 
To avoid due process concerns, the CFAA’s statutory language and judicial 
interpretations must define “authorization” to give employees sufficient 
notice of prohibited behavior and enough definiteness to guide 
enforcement.257 At first blush, the statutory terms “without authorization” 
and “exceeds authorized access” do not appear unduly ambiguous.258 Narrow 
interpretations of the CFAA give employees notice of criminal conduct and 
curb arbitrary enforcement by incorporating the commonly understood 
definitions of the two critical terms.259 Conversely, injecting principles of 
agency or contract law gives these critical terms unorthodox and unclear 
meanings that fail to adequately notify employees of what behavior is 
criminal and leave the statute vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement.260  
Broad interpretations of the CFAA violate the notice prong of the 
void for vagueness doctrine because they fail to define “authorization” in a 
way that gives employees clear notice of prohibited computer activities.261 
Nothing in the statutory language of the CFAA hints that authorization 
depends on an agency relationship or an underlying contract.262 Moreover, by 
removing an objective definition of “authorization,” broad interpretations 
remove the required notice of prohibited behavior.263 Transforming 
“authorization” into a subjective inquiry gives employees no reliable or 
predictable way to determine if they have authorization.264 Employees cannot 
act in conformity with the CFAA when the statute’s meaning varies 
                                                 
 256  See supra notes 234–237 and accompanying text (rejecting broad 
interpretations because they impermissibly expanded the scope of the CFAA).  
 257  See supra text accompanying note 103 (describing what the void for vagueness 
doctrine requires from criminal statutes to be constitutional). 
 258  See supra text accompanying notes 225–226 (explaining that plain language, 
commonly understood, and dictionary definitions define “without authorization” and 
“exceeding authorized access” respectively as no permission, and going beyond what is 
permitted). 
 259  See supra note 228 (describing why a narrow interpretation of the CFAA was 
necessary to keep it within the bounds of constitutionality); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 239–242 (explaining the Fourth Circuit’s narrow reading of the CFAA). 
 260  See supra note 216 (describing why agency and contract-based interpretations 
fail to provide a clear definition for the CFAA’s critical terms). 
 261  See supra note 103 and accompanying text (detailing the notice required under 
the void for vagueness doctrine and showing such notice is enough to allow citizens to 
conform their behavior to lawful conduct). 
 262  See supra Part II.F (describing the statutory language of the CFAA); see also 
supra note 82 (describing the statute). 
 263  See supra note 237 (describing why a broad interpretation lacks the notice 
required for all criminal statutes). 
 264  See supra text accompanying notes 162–164 (establishing that under agency 
theory, authorization depends entirely on the employee’s mental state). 
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according to the personal predilections of each employer.265 Broad 
interpretations engender too much unpredictability in place of the notice 
required by the vagueness doctrine.266 
Agency-based applications of the CFAA were established in cases 
featuring former employees whose tortious malfeasance made notice a 
nonissue.267 Despite the fact that agency law does not translate or practically 
apply to the nuanced pragmatisms of everyday employment, the holding 
from Citrin governs in at least the First Circuit.268 In the First Circuit, 
terminating an employee’s authorization after any breach of loyalty would 
likely mean that an employee who takes ten minutes to peruse social media 
sites has terminated her access if her employer decides that act was adverse 
to the company’s interest.269 Unbeknownst to the employee, her 
authorization would be terminated even after closing out of the website and 
returning to work.270 Weeks, months, or years of diligent work later, the 
employee’s access is still seemingly terminated because she has been 
“without authorization” since acting contrary to her employer’s interest.271  
A myriad of innocuous activities like checking the news, weather, or 
emailing a friend could suddenly carry criminal penalties under agency-
based interpretations of the CFAA.272 No court applying agency law to the 
CFAA has considered the effect of momentary work distractions or has 
decided what type of act is sufficiently adverse to terminate an employee’s 
authorization.273 The confusion and vagueness compounds when employers 
decide, maybe even retroactively, when authorization terminates.274 What 
                                                 
 265  See supra text accompanying notes 162–164 (establishing that under agency 
theory, authorization depends entirely on the employee’s mental state). 
 266  See supra note 237 (describing why a broad interpretation lacks the notice 
required for all criminal statutes). 
 267  See supra notes 157–184 and accompanying text (summarizing the emergence 
of agency-based interpretations of the CFAA in cases like Explorica, Shurgard, and Citrin). 
 268 See supra text accompanying note 173 (holding that an employer’s subjective 
view of an employee’s adverse act terminates authorization immediately). 
 269  See supra text accompanying notes 177–184 (demonstrating how the holding 
from Citrin could apply to a less extreme, but very typical employment situation).  
 270  See supra notes 177, 182 (applying agency law to immediately terminate 
authorization upon an employee’s adverse thought or action with no discussion of when 
authorization might reinstate).  
 271  See supra notes 177, 182 (applying agency law to immediately terminate 
authorization upon an employee’s adverse thought or action with no discussion of when 
authorization might reinstate). 
 272  See supra text accompanying notes 162–165 (explaining how terminating 
authorization depends on the employer’s subjective view of what employee actions do not 
further the interest of the company). 
 273  See supra text accompanying notes 157–184 (summarizing main agency cases; 
none address the issue of reinstating an employee’s authorization). 
 274  See supra text accompanying notes 157–184 (case law has not yet addressed 
this kind of ex post-facto application in an agency interpretation of the CFAA. However, it is 
a logical extension of current holdings, and if allowed, would trigger even more due process 
concerns.). 
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one employer may tolerate—occasional non-business-related web 
browsing—another might find an outrageous and blatant misuse of company 
time and resources.275 Within the spectrum of typical employee behavior, 
agency interpretations of the CFAA simply do not provide employees with 
sufficient notice of authorization.276  
Proponents of contract-based interpretations of the CFAA claim that 
an employee’s signature on a contract or a clearly communicated company 
policy fulfills any notice requirement.277 This argument misses the mark 
because nothing in the language of the CFAA puts an ordinary employee on 
notice that authorization is revoked and criminal liability triggered by 
breaching a private contract.278 Absent express statutory language to the 
contrary, an ordinary employee would reasonably expect that breaching a 
private agreement could result in exposure to civil liability, not 
imprisonment.279 Unless the underlying agreement specifically delineates 
employee actions that terminate “authorization,” notice is not there.280  
Additionally, many company policies or employment contracts 
contain vague terms or provisions.281 For example, generic terms prohibiting 
“non-business purposes,” or limiting computer use to “legitimate company 
business,” provide insufficient notice to employees of what computer use is 
prohibited.282 Countless employees sit in front of computers all day; without 
detailed instructions to guide them through prohibited uses or what is 
permitted if done off the clock, employees could inadvertently breach a 
contract while reading the news online over lunch.283 Like the agency 
approach, a contract-based interpretation of the CFAA is vague because 
employees do not have sufficient notice of prohibited behavior when 
                                                 
 275  See supra text accompanying notes 162–165 (explaining how terminating 
authorization depends on the employer’s subjective view of what employee actions do not 
further the interest of the company). 
 276  See supra notes 103–105 (requiring all criminal statutes to provide enough 
definiteness to put ordinary people on notice as to what conduct is prohibited so they can 
conform their behavior accordingly). 
 277  See supra text accompanying note 202 (explaining notice is not an issue when 
the defendant had reason to know that accessing data to further a criminal act could incur 
criminal liability). 
 278  See supra Part II.F (explaining current provisions of the CFAA); see also note 
82 (describing the statute). 
 279  See supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing breaches of contracts as 
an area traditionally governed by contract law). 
 280  See supra notes 209–213 and accompanying text (describing various problems 
with allowing contract drafters to establish criminal penalties). 
 281  See supra text accompanying note 191 (describing how the underlying contract 
term that was breached in Explorica prohibited disclosing information “contrary to the 
interests of EF”). 
 282  See supra note 104 (failing to distinguish between innocent conduct and 
conduct calculated to cause harm can render a statute vague). 
 283  See supra note 104 (failing to distinguish between innocent conduct and 
conduct calculated to cause harm can render a statute vague). 
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authorization depends on an employer’s subjective interpretation of an 
underlying agreement.284 
In contrast to the broad approaches’ vacillating definition of 
“authorization,” a narrow interpretation of the CFAA ensures that employees 
have notice of prohibited conduct.285 Due process concerns of notice are 
alleviated through a narrow interpretation’s objective definition of 
“authorization.”286 A narrow interpretation requires employers to take 
affirmative action to restrict or rescind authorization instead of arbitrary 
employee activity or an employer’s subjective intent immediately 
terminating authorization.287 An ordinary employee understands that 
information accessed by entering false information or circumventing security 
measures would be unauthorized.288 A narrow interpretation of the CFAA is 
the only way to ensure that employers have the notice required of all criminal 
statutes.289 
The inherent uncertainty plaguing the broad interpretations’ 
definition of “authorization” also leaves the CFAA highly susceptible to 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in violation of the vagueness 
doctrine’s second prong.290 Almost any employee action could be construed 
to terminate authorization when an employer subjectively defines the agency 
relationship or interprets a broadly-drafted contract.291 Under an agency 
interpretation, an employee’s inadvertent termination of his agency status 
means that each time he subsequently accesses a company computer, he is 
“without authorization,” which violates the CFAA.292 Similarly, contract-
based interpretations could unwittingly catch millions of employees in 
technical breach of broadly-drafted, vaguely-worded employment 
                                                 
 284  See supra note 202 (explaining how unsuspecting employees could incur civil 
and criminal liability under agency-interpretations of the CFAA because employers do not 
need to inform employees when authorization has terminated). 
 285  See supra note 233 (defining the term authorization by its commonly 
understood definition, permission, gives employees notice that accessing a company computer 
without permission is prohibited). 
 286  See supra text accompanying notes 217–219, 226 (using the commonly 
understood definitions of authorization to mean permission). 
 287  See supra note 107 (explaining that a statute is impermissibly vague if 
enforcement depends on a completely subjective standard). 
 288  See supra note 233 (defining the term authorization by its commonly 
understood definition, permission, gives employees notice that accessing a company computer 
without permission is prohibited). 
 289  See supra notes 110–112 and accompanying text (discussing how courts can 
save a potentially vague statute through a narrow interpretation). 
 290  See supra text accompanying notes 106–108 (detailing the second prong of the 
void-for-vagueness test). 
 291  See supra text accompanying notes 161–165, 210–211 (illustrating that 
terminating authorization depends on the employer’s subjective view of what employee 
actions do not further the interest of the company or on how an employer interprets an 
employment agreement). 
 292  See supra note 173 and accompanying text (explaining that terminating agency 
relationship contemporaneously terminates any authorization). 
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agreements.293 Using the CFAA, employers, service providers, and the 
government can target whomever they want by deciding either that agency 
status has terminated or by interpreting an underlying contract to find a 
breach.294 Without guidelines to ensure that only serious computer misuse 
crimes are prosecuted, broad interpretations of the CFAA are 
unconstitutionally vague.295 
Unlike broad interpretations, a narrow interpretation of the CFAA 
removes the threat of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by eliminating 
unsuspecting and innocent employees from the statute’s scope.296 The 
subjective definition of “authorization” under broad interpretations provides 
neither sufficient notice to employees nor the predictability in enforcement 
that due process requires.297 These interpretations of the CFAA are 
unconstitutionally vague.298 Until Congress acts, courts are faced with the 
responsibility of constitutionally interpreting the CFAA.299 A narrow 
interpretation is the only way the CFAA passes constitutional muster under 
the vagueness doctrine.300  
 
B.  The Overbreadth Doctrine Requires a Narrow Interpretation of the 
CFAA 
 
Broad interpretations hurl the CFAA into the depths of 
unconstitutional overbreadth.301 Agency and contract-based interpretations of 
the CFAA render the statute overbroad by criminalizing an incredible range 
of conduct in which normal, law-abiding citizens regularly engage.302 
Keeping lawful and constitutionally protected behavior out of the CFAA’s 
                                                 
 293  See supra text accompanying notes 211–213 (allowing service providers to 
draft agreement contracts which result in criminal sanctions gives them complete power). 
 294  See supra notes 213–216 and accompanying text (criminally prosecuting a 
woman for breaching MySpace’s terms of service agreement). 
 295  See supra note 237 (finding broad interpretations unconstitutionally vague by 
transforming entire categories of otherwise innocent behavior into federal crimes). 
 296  See supra text accompanying notes 234–235 (explaining how broad 
interpretations transform the CFAA from a criminal hacking statute into an expansive 
misappropriation statute). 
 297  See supra notes 106–108 and accompanying text (drawing no distinction 
between innocent conduct and conduct calculated to cause harm renders a statute 
unconstitutionally vague). 
 298  See supra note 237 (outlining the different ways that broad interpretations fail 
to provide notice and encourage arbitrary enforcement). 
 299  See supra notes 110–112  and accompanying text (directing courts to save a 
statute from vagueness through a narrow interpretation if plausible). 
 300  See supra note 103 and accompanying text (explaining the vagueness doctrine 
and what is required in order for a statute to be in compliance with the Constitution). 
 301  See supra text accompanying notes 27, 114–116 (describing the CFAA as the 
primary federal statute used to combat computer crime. A statute will be overbroad if its 
sanctions apply to constitutionally protected activity.). 
 302  See supra note 152 (explaining how broad views terminate authorization based 
on an employee’s intent regardless of subsequent actions).   
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reach and sidestepping overbreadth concerns requires a narrow 
interpretation.303  
 Allowing criminal liability to hinge on an employee’s subjective 
intent at any given moment renders an agency-based interpretation of the 
CFAA improperly overbroad by capturing hoards of legitimate behavior and 
producing uncertain results.304 Agency interpretations of the CFAA 
transform substantial amounts of innocent employee conduct into actionable 
malfeasance by turning an employee’s subversive thought—however fleeting 
or harmless—into a total termination of access.305 To the agency 
interpretation’s logical conclusion, every employee giving notice spends her 
last two weeks incurring potential civil and criminal liability each time she 
accesses a computer.306 Sweeping so much plainly legitimate activity into a 
criminal statute’s scope makes an agency-based interpretation of the CFAA 
unconstitutionally overbroad.307  
A contract-based interpretation of the CFAA is overbroad because it 
allows private parties to determine criminal conduct and allows the 
government to prosecute constitutionally protected behavior that is otherwise 
non-punishable.308 Granting employers and service providers unilateral 
power to construct agreements where breaches result in criminal and civil 
liability encourages even broader underlying contracts.309 Determining 
liability based on the mere breach of an agreement instead of analyzing the 
validity of the underlying agreement elicits vagueness concerns, overbreadth 
                                                 
 303  See supra text accompanying notes 228–229 (discussing how keeping the 
CFAA constitutional requires a limiting interpretation). 
 304  See supra note 213–216 and accompanying text (explaining that holding a 
misdemeanor as a violation of the CFAA is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague). 
 305  See supra text accompanying notes 234–235 (explaining that broad 
interpretations transform the CFAA from a criminal hacking statute into an expansive 
misappropriation statute). 
 306  See supra notes 234–237and accompanying text (illustrating how a broad 
interpretation of the CFAA can capture lots of legitimate activity. An employee’s two-week 
notice of termination, even though customary, is still adverse to the employer’s interest. Under 
a broad, contact-based interpretation of the CFAA, the act of giving notice immediately 
terminates the employee’s authorization. Even if the employee still has valid log-in 
information and can access computer files, any access past the adverse act is without 
authorization.).  
 307  See supra text accompanying notes 115, 161 (hinging authorization on an 
employer’s subjective view of adverse to his interest increases the likelihood that much of an 
employee’s subsequent legitimate behavior is also unauthorized). 
 308  See supra text accompanying notes 115, 209–212 (comparing government’s 
inability to prohibit constitutionally protected behavior with an employer or service provider’s 
ability to write any terms they desire). 
 309  See supra text accompanying notes 115, 209–212 (drafting contracts to provide 
maximum protection for the employer encourages using broad and vague terms, can also 
improperly restrict speech in violation of the First Amendment). 
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concerns, and the potential to substantially infringe on constitutionally 
protected behavior.310  
Tying criminal liability to the terms of privately drafted agreements 
runs a severe risk of curbing First Amendment freedoms.311 If an 
employment contract prohibits employees from expressing pro-choice views, 
an employee could be held criminally liable under a broad interpretation of 
the CFAA for emailing a friend to express a pro-choice view—even if done 
on his own time from a personal email account—if the email was sent from a 
company computer.312 Individuals are free to commit to this type of contract 
provision with other private parties.313 However, the government cannot use 
the CFAA to indirectly prosecute behavior that it cannot directly punish.314 
The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private content-
based speech; the government cannot make an end-run around the United 
States Constitution by using an employee’s breach of a private contract to 
punish the same constitutionally protected expression.315  
Terms of service agreements containing the same type of provision 
could severely impinge freedom of speech by restricting seemingly public 
sites and inhibiting the free flow of information.316 Contract-based 
interpretations of the CFAA impermissibly allow private parties to determine 
criminal penalties, and allow the government to control otherwise 
constitutionally protected behavior.317 The implications of a contract-based 
interpretation of the CFAA are appallingly and unconstitutionally 
overbroad.318 
                                                 
 310  See supra notes 103, 186 (showing how the due process required for all 
criminal statutes per the vagueness doctrine is not examined under a contract-based 
interpretation of the CFAA). 
 311  See supra notes 115–117 (explaining that statutes are overbroad if they violate 
a constitutionally protected right). 
 312  See supra text accompanying note 187 (breaching an employment agreement 
under a contract-based interpretation of the CFAA renders an employee’s subsequent 
computer access either without authorization or exceeding authorized access). 
 313  See supra notes 113–117, 213–216 and accompanying text (describing how 
broad interpretations of the CFAA can infringe on constitutionally protected rights). 
 314  See supra text accompanying note 114 (explaining that statutes are overbroad if 
sanctions apply to conduct that the government is not entitled to regulate). 
 315  See supra notes 113–117, 213–216 and accompanying text (describing how 
broad interpretations of the CFAA can infringe on constitutionally protected rights). 
 316  See supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining that statutes are 
overbroad if they violate a constitutionally protected right). 
 317  See supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining that statutes are 
overbroad if sanctions apply to conduct that the government is not entitled to regulate). See 
also text accompanying note 123 (proscribing criminal conduct falls to legislatures and not 
private parties). 
 318  See supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining that statutes are 
overbroad if sanctions apply to conduct that the government is not entitled to regulate). 
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The CFAA is already set up to capture millions of Americans who 
use computers daily.319 A narrow interpretation of the CFAA is required in 
order to keep the prohibited behavior limited to illegal activity and not in 
violation of the overbreadth doctrine.320   
 
C. Canons of Statutory Construction Require a Narrow Interpretation of 
the CFAA 
 
Broad interpretations of the CFAA run completely contrary to basic 
canons of statutory construction that exist to help guide a court to Congress’s 
intended purpose.321 Unsurprisingly, courts ignoring these canons to arrive at 
a broadly interpreted result also ignore the CFAA’s intended purpose.322 
Agency and contract-based interpretations veer inappropriately into 
Congress’s stead of lawmaking by disregarding widely established canons 
like the rule of lenity, the plain language rule, no mere surplusage, and the 
canon of consistency to get to a desired result.323 In contrast, courts seeking 
to effectuate the plain language of the CFAA in consonance with other 
canons of statutory construction end up with a narrow interpretation.324 
Recognizing that these statutory tools exist to help courts uncover the true 
legislative intent, courts narrowly interpreting the CFAA stay faithful to 
these canons.325 Sticking to these established statutory canons results in a 
constitutionally sound, congressionally supported, narrow, interpretation of 
the CFAA.326 Consequently, broad interpretations that thwart these 
established canons are entirely incorrect.327 
 
 
 
                                                 
 319  See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text (describing that the CFAA’s 
scope includes all computers). 
 320  See supra note 216 and accompanying text (concluding a narrow interpretation 
is necessary in order to keep the CFAA from capturing unsuspecting and innocent behavior). 
 321  See supra Part II.A, text accompanying note 99, and Part IV.A–B (comparing 
the purposes of the CFAA and canons of statutory construction with a broad interpretation). 
 322  See supra Part II.A, text accompanying note 99, and Part IV.A–B (comparing 
the purposes of the CFAA and canons of statutory construction with a broad interpretation). 
 323  See infra Part V.C (explaining how broad interpretations of the CFAA 
disregard canons of statutory construction and distort Congressional intent). 
 324  See supra Part II.A, Part III.C–F, and Part IV.C (comparing the purposes of the 
CFAA and canons of statutory construction with a narrow interpretation). 
 325  See infra Part V.C (arguing that narrow interpretations faithfully follow 
established canons of statutory constructions and lead to effectuating the actual intent behind 
the CFAA). 
 326  See infra Part V.C (arguing that narrow interpretations faithfully follow 
established canons of statutory constructions and lead to effectuating the actual intent behind 
the CFAA). 
 327  See infra Part V.C (arguing that narrow interpretations faithfully follow 
established canons of statutory constructions and lead to effectuating the actual intent behind 
the CFAA). 
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1.  The Rule of Lenity Requires a Narrow Interpretation of the CFAA 
 
The rule of lenity’s application to the CFAA is appropriate and 
necessary.328 The constitutional requirement of fair notice coupled with the 
divisive split in authority overwhelmingly satisfies the rule’s stringent 
prerequisites.329 The CFAA’s primary use in civil contexts does not discount 
the rule of lenity’s application; it is a criminal statute, and citizens are 
required to have fair notice of criminal conduct.330 Furthermore, the CFAA’s 
extreme ambiguity is evidenced by the disparate and inconsistent definitions 
accorded to “authorization” across the three views.331 All three theories have 
plunged headfirst into the CFAA’s legislative history and all have emerged 
clutching selective excerpts to support their view.332 Even with the cautioned 
use of the rule of lenity as one of last resort, its use is necessary to keep the 
CFAA in alignment with constitutional standards.333  
Applying the rule of lenity to the CFAA produces results consistent 
with a narrow view.334 Resolving ambiguity in favor of the defendant 
requires constraining the scope of the CFAA to only apply to conduct that is 
clearly prohibited.335 A narrow interpretation accomplishes this by limiting 
the CFAA’s scope to its commonly understood meaning.336 Broad 
interpretations inappropriately breathe agency and contract law into the 
CFAA when neither body of law is found in the statute’s plain language or 
the legislative history.337 Additionally, the broad interpretations’ inherent 
                                                 
 328  See supra note 125 and accompanying text (describing the rule of lenity’s use 
as a canon of statutory construction as one of last resort; to be invoked only when there is 
serious ambiguity in the statute). 
 329  See supra text accompanying notes 125–126, 150–156 (comparing the rule of 
lenity’s prerequisites and the current split in authority over the definition of “authorization” in 
the CFAA). 
 330  See supra text accompanying notes 27, 103 (describing the CFAA as primarily 
a criminal statute, and explaining that all statutes with criminal applications are subject to the 
vagueness doctrine). 
 331  See supra text accompanying notes 150–156 (describing the current circuit 
court split over the definition of “authorization” in the CFAA). 
 332  See supra notes 175–176, 228–235 and accompanying text (comparing broad 
interpretations supporting legislative history with narrow interpretation’s supporting 
legislative history). 
 333  See supra text accompanying notes 125–126, 150–156 (comparing the rule of 
lenity’s prerequisites and the current split in authority over the definition of “authorization” in 
the CFAA). 
 334  See supra text accompanying note 237 (interpreting the CFAA narrowly and 
consistently with the rule of lenity). 
 335  See supra text accompanying note 119 (applying the rule of lenity requires 
choosing the interpretation most protective of the defendant to ensure sufficient notice). 
 336  See supra notes 217–219 and accompanying text (describing how a narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA applies). 
 337  See supra notes 84, 152–154 and accompanying text (comparing the plain 
language of the statute with overview of broad views’ application). 
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lack of notice produces surprising and unexpected results.338 Employees who 
understand “authorization” to mean permission would be surprised if 
authorization terminated abruptly and without notice through agency or 
contract law, especially if employees are still able to access company 
accounts or accurately log into a company computer.339 Lastly, broad 
interpretations of the CFAA incorrectly favor plaintiffs by allowing an 
employer’s subjective motivation to dictate criminal and civil liability.340 
When a statute like the CFAA produces such varying and 
inconsistent results, the rule of lenity is required to make sure that due 
process requirements are being met and that rulemaking stays in the 
legislative sphere.341 The rule of lenity directs courts to choose a narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA because out of the three interpretations currently 
in play across jurisdictions, it is the one most protective of defendants.342 
 
2.   The Plain Language of the CFAA Requires a Narrow 
 Interpretation 
 
The plain language of the CFAA prohibits improper access to 
information.343 A court tracking the plain language of the CFAA will limit 
claims to those alleging improper access because that is as far as the statutory 
language extends.344 A narrow interpretation follows the plain language rule 
by correctly restricting the CFAA’s scope to its statutory language and 
supplementing only undefined terms with commonly understood 
meanings.345 Broad interpretations extend impermissibly beyond any plain 
language interpretation of the CFAA by incorporating “purpose” or “use” 
and subjective intent into a statute that deals objectively with access.346  
                                                 
 338  See supra note 229 and accompanying text (explaining that employees would 
be surprised if they were suddenly subject to criminal sanctions despite continued access to 
company computers).  
 339  See supra note 128 (explaining that an employee breaching an employment 
contract or terms of service agreement would not expect that breach to result in criminal 
liability). 
 340  See supra notes 82, 152–154 and accompanying text (comparing the plain 
language of the statute with overview of broad views’ application). 
 341  See supra notes 224–227 and accompanying text (describing why a narrow 
interpretation stays true to the statutory language and is most protective of defendants). 
 342  See supra notes 227–229 and accompanying text (describing why a narrow 
interpretation stays true to the statutory language and is most protective of defendants). 
 343  See supra note 82 (describing the CFAA). 
 344  See supra notes 82, 226 and accompanying text (explaining a plain language 
definition of the CFAA). 
 345  See supra notes 139–142 and accompanying text (describing that Congress acts 
purposefully in choosing words for statutes). 
 346  See supra note 11 (focusing on how an employee uses the accessed information 
to determine liability).   
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 Broad interpretations construe the CFAA as if it reads “exceeds 
authorized use” instead of “exceeds authorized access.”347 Agency and 
contract-based interpretations examine the subsequent purpose and use for 
the improperly accessed information instead of following the statute’s 
directive and examining whether access was authorized.348 What an 
employee does with the information taken from a computer is separate from 
how an employee accessed the information in the computer and the CFAA 
speaks only to the latter.349 Interpreting the CFAA according to the statute’s 
plain language requires a narrow interpretation.350  
Broad interpretations of the CFAA not only violate the letter of the 
plain language rule by inserting extraneous words into the statute, they also 
violate the spirit of the rule by directly contradicting Congressional intent.351 
Congress originally included “use” in the statute but replaced it with 
“exceeds authorized access” in the first round of amendments.352 Agency and 
contract-based interpretations are incorrect because persistent incorporation 
of “use” flagrantly returns the CFAA to a version Congress has expressly 
revoked.353  
With no definition of “without authorization” in the CFAA, the plain 
language rule directs courts to define the term in accordance with its ordinary 
meaning.354 Courts narrowly interpreting the CFAA follow this fundamental 
rule and look to dictionaries and common usage to define “authorization” as 
“permission or power granted by authority.”355 In the employment context, 
an employer grants access by providing an employee with a user name and 
password.356 Once an employee has this access, any subsequent improper 
access would fall under the CFAA provision “exceeding authorized 
access.”357 Only non-employees, employees without initial access, and 
                                                 
 347  See supra text accompanying note 173 (basing liability on an employee’s 
adverse intent). 
 348  See supra text accompanying note 173 (basing liability on an employee’s 
adverse intent). 
 349  See supra notes 229, 233 (describing the difference between basing liability on 
access or improper motive). 
 350  See supra text accompanying notes 27, 130–138 (comparing the language of 
the CFAA to the plain language doctrine). 
 351  See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (describing why Congress 
removed “use” from the CFAA in 1986). 
 352  See supra text accompanying note 59 (describing the language of the original 
CFAA). 
 353  See supra note 60 (describing why Congress removed “use” from the CFAA in 
1986). 
 354  See supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text (directing a court to use an 
ordinary, commonly understood meaning for an undefined statutory term). 
 355  See supra note 246 (summarizing how various courts have come to the same 
definition of “authorization” under a narrow interpretation). 
 356  See supra text accompanying notes 217–219 (describing a narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA). 
 357  See supra text accompanying note 240 (finding an employee with access 
cannot be without authorization under the CFAA). 
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employees with revoked authorization qualify as “without authorization” 
under the CFAA.358 This narrow, straightforward reading of the CFAA 
accurately and objectively focuses the inquiry on access.359 
The plain language of the CFAA directs courts to objectively 
analyze whether an employee’s access was authorized by framing the statute 
in terms of “access.”360 Narrow interpretations undertake this objective 
analysis in consonance with the plain language by focusing on the actions 
taken by an employer to grant or deny access.361 Broad interpretations 
instead embark on a subjective assessment of the employee’s intent.362 This 
subjective analysis is completely unwarranted because the CFAA contains no 
language suggesting that liability hinges on a breach of contract or 
termination of an agency relationship.363 Broad interpretations predicating 
liability on a subjective assessment of an employee’s subsequent use of 
information are beyond the scope of the CFAA and contrary to its plain 
language.364 While other obligations owed to an employer like company 
policies, employment agreements, or fiduciary duties may prohibit misuse of 
computer accessed information, the plain text of the CFAA does not.365 
Broad interpretations violate the plain language of the CFAA by failing to 
limit the statute’s scope to the statutory language.366 
The statutory language of the CFAA expressly prohibits improper 
access of computer information.367 This is precisely the definition and scope 
under a narrow interpretation of the CFAA.368 Following the plain language 
rule, narrow interpretations appropriately restrict the CFAA to claims 
alleging improper access.369 Claims alleging misuse are correctly dismissed 
                                                 
 358  See supra text accompanying notes 217–219 (describing a narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA). 
 359  See supra text accompanying notes 217–219 (describing a narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA). 
 360  See supra text accompanying note 219 (focusing liability on the affirmative 
actions of an employer). 
 361 See supra text accompanying note 233 (failing to revoke an employee’s access 
means they are not without authorization under the CFAA). 
 362  See supra text accompanying note 152 (focusing on the employee’s intent to 
determine liability under broad interpretations of the CFAA). 
 363  See supra notes 27, 227 (illustrating the actions prohibited under the CFAA 
and noting that nothing in the language indicates agency or contract law applies). 
 364  See supra notes 57–67 and accompanying text (removing “use” as a basis for 
liability in an early amendment). 
 365  See supra notes 57–67 and accompanying text (limiting actions proscribed by 
the statutes to unauthorized access or access that exceeds authorization). 
 366  See supra notes 57–67 and accompanying text (limiting actions proscribed by 
the statutes to unauthorized access or access that exceeds authorization). 
 367  See supra note 233 (determining the plain language meaning of the statutory 
language). 
 368  See supra notes 225–227 and accompanying text (narrowly interpreting the 
language so that it only applies to conduct clearly proscribed by the CFAA’s plain language).  
 369  See supra text accompanying notes 217–219 (describing a narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA). 
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under narrow interpretations since “use” is neither in the CFAA’s vernacular 
nor part of the commonly understood definition of “authorization.”370 
 
3.   The Canon “No Mere Surplusage” Requires a Narrow 
 Interpretation of the CFAA 
 
The broad, agency-based interpretation of the CFAA violates the 
canon of construction “no mere surplusage” by collapsing the distinction 
between “without authorization” and “exceeding authorized access.”371 
Applying the canon of no mere surplusage to the CFAA reminds courts that 
Congress chooses statutory language purposefully and would not have 
included both of the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized 
access” in the CFAA if they simply meant the same thing.372 Any court 
applying agency theory to the CFAA blatantly ignores the duty to effectuate 
Congressional intent by rendering the term “exceeds authorized access” 
superfluous.373  The agency-based interpretation’s clear violation of no mere 
surplusage makes it an incorrect interpretation of the CFAA.374 
 A careful examination of the CFAA’s structure and its legislative 
history reveals why an agency interpretation is so egregious.375 Quite simply, 
the difference between unauthorized access and exceeding authorized access 
matters.376 The terms were not meant as synonyms.377 Senate reports indicate 
that Congress associated the term “without authorization” with outsiders, and 
“exceeds unauthorized access” with insiders.378 The CFAA was structured 
purposefully to reflect these two separate groups of violators: insiders and 
outsiders are treated differently.379 Congress generally viewed insiders as less 
culpable than outsiders and the various subsections and penalty schemes 
                                                 
 370  See supra notes 225– 229 and accompanying text (narrowly interpreting the 
language so that it only applies to conduct clearly by the CFAA’s plain language). 
 371  See supra text accompanying notes 139–140 (presuming Congress uses words 
purposefully and courts should give effect to every word if possible). 
 372  See supra note 140 and accompanying text (assuming that because a statute 
included both “uses” and “carries,” Congress intended each word to have a distinct meaning).  
 373  See supra note 228 (rejecting an agency approach because it renders part of the 
statute meaningless).  
 374  See supra note 228 (rejecting an agency approach because it renders part of the 
statute meaningless). 
 375  See supra Part II.A–B (targeting outsiders in the CFAA but also including 
insiders in certain circumstances). 
 376  See supra notes 65–66 (explaining the purpose between having two separate 
phrases in the CFAA). 
 377  See supra notes 65–66 (explaining the purpose between having two separate 
phrases in the CFAA). 
 378 See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text (demonstrating Congress used the 
term “without authorization” to apply to outsiders and the term “exceeds authorized access” to 
apply to insiders with an existing level of authorization). 
 379  See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text (demonstrating Congress used 
the term “without authorization” to apply to outsiders and the term “exceeds authorized 
access” to apply to insiders with an existing level of authorization). 
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reflect this sentiment.380 For example, an early amendment removed the term 
“exceeds authorized access” from a subsection that previously contained 
both terms because Congress wanted to limit applicability to outsiders.381 
Congress’s conscientious use of two separate terms—each with its own 
unique definition—demonstrates why any interpretation that transposes or 
conflates the meaning of the two terms is incorrect.382 
Agency theory eliminates any distinction between the terms “without 
authorization” and “exceeds authorized access.”383 Terminating authorization 
immediately upon any employee act that does not further the employer’s 
interest defines “without authorization,” but renders “exceeds authorized 
access” meaningless.384 The employee either has authorization when 
accessing his employer’s computer system to further the company’s interests, 
or he has no authorization upon acting adversely to his employer’s interest.385 
The employee can never “exceed authorized access;” he is either authorized 
or unauthorized.386 Eliminating an entire explicitly defined term indicates 
that an agency-based interpretation of the CFAA is inappropriate.387  
Beyond compressing two distinct statutory terms into one, agency-
based interpretations completely invert Congress’s intent for outsiders to be 
categorized as acting “without authorization” with insiders acting to “exceed[ 
] authorized access.”388 By terminating current employees’ authorization 
upon adverse acts, agency-based interpretations of the CFAA hold that 
current employees act “without authorization” instead of “exceeding 
                                                 
 380  See supra note 65 (outlining the CFAA which imposes the most severe penalty 
on a subsection that uses the term “without authorization” but not “exceeds authorized 
access); see also note 32 (comparing subsections of the statute that include both terms 
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” with subsections that only use the 
term “without authorization”); see also note 226 (differentiating the terms “without 
authorization” and “exceeds authorized use”). 
 381  See supra notes 66–67 (expressing concern that leaving insiders in this 
subsection would expose them to liability for computer misuses which should not rise to the 
level of criminal conduct). 
 382  See supra note 227 (explaining it is incorrect to interpret a statute in a way that 
leaves part of the language in the statute meaningless). 
 383  See supra note 228 (rejecting an agency approach because it renders part of the 
statute meaningless). 
 384  See supra text accompanying notes 173–174 (holding that the defendant, who 
was an employee at the time of the alleged access, was “without authorization” after 
terminating his agency relationship). 
 385  See supra text accompanying notes 162–164 (explaining how an employee is 
either authorized or unauthorized under an agency-based interpretation of the CFAA). 
 386  See supra text accompanying notes 162–164 (explaining how an employee is 
either authorized or unauthorized under an agency-based interpretation of the CFAA). 
 387  See supra text accompanying notes 139–142 (explaining that Congress chooses 
statutory language carefully and any interpretation that ignores part of the statutory language 
does not effectuate Congressional intent). 
 388  See supra notes 65–67, 173 (comparing Congressional intent in using two 
separate terms for insiders and outsiders, with an agency-based interpretation which applies 
the terms incorrectly). 
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authorized access” which Congress intended for insiders.389 Similarly 
contravening Congressional intent under a contract-based interpretation of 
the CFAA, the First Circuit in Explorica held that a former employee 
(outsider) had “exceeded authorized access” (Congress’s designated term for 
insider) by accessing a public website.390 Agency courts for the most part 
unabashedly ignore this canon of statutory construction, unconcerned with 
the distorted CFAA they leave in their wake. Courts attempting to address 
the canon of no mere surplusage under an agency-based interpretation the 
CFAA have struggled to articulate any meaningful difference between the 
two terms.391  
 An agency-based interpretation of the CFAA is incorrect because it 
inverts Congressional intent and fails to distinguish between separate phrases 
in the statute.392 On the other hand, a narrow interpretation of the CFAA 
gives sensible and distinct constructions to “without authorization” and 
“exceeds authorized access” in accordance with Congressional intent.393 
Under a narrow interpretation, a person is “without authorization” only when 
initial access is not permitted, and a person “exceed[s] authorized access” 
when initial access is permitted, but the access of certain information is not 
permitted.394 This narrow view gives each term a distinct meaning and 
supports Congress’s intended application by applying “without 
authorization” to outsiders and applying “exceeds authorized access” to 
insiders.395 
 
4.  The Canon of Consistency Requires a Narrow Interpretation of the 
 CFAA 
 
Courts broadly interpreting the CFAA do not appear overly 
concerned with the canon of consistency.396 However, ignoring this canon is 
                                                 
 389  See supra note 173 and accompanying text (holding that once an employee acts 
adversely to his employer, he is “without authorization” and leaving no situation where an 
employee could ever “exceed authorized access” like Congress intended). 
 390  See supra text accompanying notes 193–194 (finding under a contract-based 
interpretation that the employee had broken a confidentiality agreement by acting adversely to 
the employer’s interests). 
 391  See supra text accompanying note 184 (admitting the difference was “paper-
thin” and using Explorica’s holding as evidence of the distinction in terms). 
 392  See supra notes 162–165 and accompanying text (holding an employee is 
“without authorization” once they act adversely to their employer); see also notes 188–194 
and accompanying text (applying a contract-based interpretation of the CFAA producing 
results incongruent with Congressional intent). 
 393  See supra note 226 (explaining in differences in the two terms under a narrow 
interpretation). 
 394  See supra note 226 (explaining in differences in the two terms under a narrow 
interpretation). 
 395  See supra note 227 (rejecting the agency theory because it equates the two 
terms contravening Congressional intent). 
 396  See supra Part V.A–B (describing how broad definitions fail to consider how 
precedent will affect situations outside the one at issue). 
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a grievous error when interpreting a statute like the CFAA.397 Congress 
dictated that the same meaning should be applied throughout the statute by 
providing one definition for “exceeds authorized access” and using the term 
in multiple sections.398 Although the CFAA repeats the same terms 
continuously, the elements for each subsection vary.399 Each subsection’s 
unique elemental composition requires that courts use caution when 
interpreting a term since that term’s definition will apply to the entire 
statute.400   
Courts broadly interpreting the CFAA in civil contexts are quick to 
adopt definitions that work for the immediate case but could not translate 
across subsections or to a criminal context without violating other 
constitutional protections.401  
A narrow interpretation of the CFAA is the only way for courts to 
successfully apply consistent definitions across subsections and effectuate 
Congressional intent.402 The Ninth Circuit recognized this in Nosal when it 
rejected the government’s proposed broad definition of “exceeds authorized 
access.”403 Although the definition was proposed for the fraud provision 
charged in the case, the court correctly considered how the definition would 
affect other subsections of the statute.404 Inserting the proposed meaning into 
the broadest subsection of the CFAA containing the term “exceeds 
authorized access,” (a subsection requiring only that a person who “exceeds 
authorized access” obtain information from a protected computer), the court 
wisely declined the government’s definition.405 Since obtaining information 
                                                 
 397  See supra notes 32, 82–83 and accompanying text (describing Congress’s 
repeated use of the same terms—i.e. “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized 
access”—throughout the CFAA as well as noting the statute’s criminal and civil applications). 
 398  See supra notes 145–148 and accompanying text (stating that identical words 
and phrases within a statute should be given the same meaning). 
 399  See supra notes 65, 82–83 and accompanying text (describing the different 
sections of the CFAA). 
 400  See supra notes 145–149 and accompanying text (illustrating why a court 
should take care when interpreting statutes with criminal and civil applications). 
 401  See supra Part V.A–B (describing how broad definitions fail to consider how 
precedent will affect situations outside the one at issue and are in violation of the void for 
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines). 
 402  See supra notes 147–148 (describing how the mens rea requirements vary 
within subsections of the CFAA). 
 403  See supra notes 148, 237–238 and accompanying text (applying the canon of 
consistency to eliminate a proposed broad interpretation of the CFAA; deciding instead to 
narrowly interpret “exceeds authorized access” to stay in compliance with the canon of 
consistency). 
 404  See supra notes 148, 237–238 and accompanying text (applying the canon of 
consistency to eliminate a proposed broad interpretation of the CFAA; deciding instead to 
narrowly interpret “exceeds authorized access” to stay in compliance with the canon of 
consistency). 
 405  See supra notes 82, 237–238 (finding § 1030(a)(2)(C) to be the broadest 
subsection of the CFAA because it does not require any intent beyond intentionally 
“exceed[ing] authorized access” to view information on a computer). 
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from a protected computer translates into viewing any information on any 
computer, the court correctly surmised that adopting the government’s 
definition would impermissibly “transform whole categories of otherwise 
innocuous behavior into federal crimes simply because a computer is 
involved.”406 
Broad interpretations of the CFAA cannot be applied consistently 
without triggering constitutional concerns.407 Criminal statutes require due 
process and applying restrictive, consistent, definitions to the CFAA is the 
only way to ensure the statute is constitutional.408 In order to consistently 
define “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” in civil and 
criminal contexts and across subsections, a narrow interpretation of the 
CFAA is required.409  
 
D.  Broad Interpretations Defeat the Intended Scope of the CFAA 
 
Broad views mistakenly cite to the CFAA’s expansive amendments 
as proof that the statute was meant to apply widely.410 Broad views contend 
that narrow interpretations ignore the consistent amendments that Congress 
has enacted to broaden its application.411 This argument misinterprets the 
statute’s amendments and overlooks the subject of the CFAA.412 While the 
CFAA has undoubtedly broadened in scope, these expansions reflect 
Congress’s effort to keep the CFAA relevant in the face of quickly evolving 
technology; they are not an effort to subsume existing state laws.413 
 Congress knew even before 1984 that attempting to combat 
computer crime with one statute would be an ongoing effort and one likely to 
involve frequent amendments.414 The widely-criticized original version was 
so narrowly drawn that it proved unusable.415 Although the first round of 
                                                 
 406  See supra note 236 (explaining that the government’s proposed broad 
definition of “exceeds authorized access” under the fraud section would make any violation of 
a private agreement subject to criminal liability under the CFAA). 
 407  See supra note 237 (outlining various ways that a broad interpretation of the 
CFAA raises constitutional concerns). 
 408  See supra note 228 (interpreting the CFAA narrowly results in consistent 
definitions that meet the due process demanded from all criminal statutes). 
 409  See supra note 228 (interpreting the CFAA narrowly results in consistent 
definitions that meet the due process demanded from all criminal statutes). 
 410  See supra note 176 and accompanying text (defending a broad interpretation of 
the CFAA due to its expansive amendments). 
 411  See supra note 176 and accompanying text (defending a broad interpretation of 
the CFAA due to its expansive amendments). 
 412  See supra notes 47, 81 (describing the purpose of the CFAA as one to combat 
new types of computer crimes). 
 413  See supra note 81 (admitting that frequent amendments might be necessary in 
order to keep the CFAA relevant).  
 414  See supra note 81 (admitting that frequent amendments might be necessary in 
order to keep the CFAA relevant). 
 415  See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties 
encountered in the original statute). 
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amendments in 1986 was expansive, it was entirely remedial and necessary 
to reset the CFAA’s bounds in order for the statute to achieve its designed 
purpose.416 Expansive amendments were necessary to protect confidential 
information in public and private sector computers and to make it an 
effective tool against computer crime which is interstate in nature.417 Yet, 
throughout all of the technical changes implemented over the years, 
Congress has never once altered the CFAA’s purpose or narrow scope.418 
The amendments only expand the CFAA’s application in order to keep it 
relevant and applicable to new types of computer crimes, not to override 
existing statutes.419 
Congress deliberately did not preempt the field of computer crime 
when the CFAA was originally enacted, and it continues to amend the statute 
without exercising its preemption power.420 Not exercising its preemption 
power is evidence of Congressional intent to preserve the narrow scope of 
the CFAA.421 Even the most expansive amendments came with estimates 
from the Departments of Justice and Treasury stating that the changes would 
not result in any significant cost to the federal government.422 If Congress 
meant for the vigorous application of the CFAA in employment contexts, the 
estimates of costs incurred would not be negligible.423 Congress has not 
wavered from its original intent to limit the CFAA to crimes involving a 
compelling federal interest.424 Broad views fail to recognize that even 
capturing just one federally compelling computer criminal would still require 
an extremely broad reach.425  
                                                 
 416  See supra Part II.C (amending the CFAA was necessary to make it an effective 
tool to combat computer crimes). 
 417  See supra note 52 (expanding the CFAA’s scope to protect more financial 
information). 
 418  See supra Part II.C (amending the CFAA was necessary to make it an effective 
tool to combat computer crimes). 
 419  See supra Part II.C (amending the CFAA was necessary to make it an effective 
tool to combat computer crimes). 
 420  See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text (demanding that if Congress 
intends to preempt or drastically alter the federal-state balance, it must speak clearly). 
 421  See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text (presuming that Congress 
meant to preserve the federal-state balance by not including a clear preemption provision in 
the CFAA). 
 422  See supra note 81 (noting that Congress did not expect the introduction of the 
civil provision to incur any significant costs to state or federal government). 
 423  See supra notes 29–30 (noting the surge in number of claims after the civil 
provision was introduced). 
 424  See supra note 70 (limiting the scope of the CFAA to crimes involving a 
compelling federal interest). 
 425  See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text (noting the interstate nature of 
computer crimes). 
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The expansive reach of the Commerce Clause is necessary to 
effectively combat the insidious, interstate nature of computer crime.426 An 
expansive definition for “protected computer” reflects technological 
advances that have rendered even the smallest devices capable of storing 
large amounts of data.427 The civil provision was added to boost the deterrent 
value of the statute and to allow private companies to recover for purposeful 
damages.428 Despite all of the expansions, the narrative woven throughout 
the legislative history is one of concern for potential damage to the nation’s 
financial, educational, and scientific information at the hands of malicious 
hackers or insidious viruses.429 Nowhere are those same concerns echoed for 
employees who misappropriate data.430 Despite mountains of legislative 
history to the contrary, broad interpretations continue to inaccurately equate 
the inclusion of the Commerce Clause in the CFAA with a green light for an 
expansive scope.431 
Broad interpretations capture employee behavior that Congress 
intended to keep outside the CFAA’s reach by welcoming disgruntled 
employer claims.432 Although insiders have firmly been in the CFAA’s range 
since its inception, Congress took steps to ensure that even objectionable 
authorized employee actions would not be prosecuted under the CFAA 
unless clearly criminal.433 Recognizing the potential gray-area for employees 
with access to company computers, Congress raised the mens rea in an early 
amendment to eliminate accidental access from the statute’s reach.434 
Further, senate reports caution that employees who briefly exceed their 
access should be subject to administrative rather than criminal 
proceedings.435  
                                                 
 426  See supra notes 47, 78 (describing the purpose of the CFAA was to effectively 
combat serious computer misuse crimes and acknowledging those were mainly interstate in 
nature). 
 427  See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text (noting the interstate nature of 
computer crimes and always-evolving technology). 
 428  See supra text accompanying notes 71–74 (explaining why the civil provision 
was added to the CFAA). 
 429  See supra notes 34–36 (discussing the types of computer crime targeted by the 
CFAA).  
 430  See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (attempting to eliminate 
misbehaving employees from the CFAA’s scope unless the behavior was clearly criminal). 
 431  See supra Parts II.C, II.E (justifying the expansive amendments as necessary in 
order to keep the CFAA effective as a tool to combat compelling federal interest crimes of 
serious compute misuse). 
 432  See supra note 49 (describing the difference in types of computer crimes). 
 433  See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (stating a preference for 
administrative sanctions for employee misconduct instead of prosecution under the CFAA). 
 434  See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (eliminating insider liability for 
accidental access). 
 435  See supra note 67 (deciding employees who briefly exceeded authorized use 
should be subject to administrative sanctions rather than punished under the CFAA, especially 
in situations where the computer is not clearly delineated to communicate which access is 
prohibited).  
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Congress meant to exclude the behavior now openly litigated under 
agency and contract-based interpretations of the CFAA by taking steps to 
avoid situations where employees could face liability for slight unauthorized 
use.436 Broad interpretations allow liability to hang from even slight or 
unknowing employee missteps if contrary to an employer’s interest or in 
breach of a company policy.437 A brief lapse in diligence under an agency 
interpretation or a slight breach of company policy under a contract 
interpretation and an employer can haul an employee to federal court in 
jurisdictions adopting broad views.438 The inherent uncertainties in these 
broad, subjective views create the exact situation Congress did not want the 
statute to cover.439 Accordingly, broad, subjective views are not correct 
interpretations of the CFAA.440 
Broad views also demolish the purpose of the CFAA by 
misunderstanding the type of crime targeted by the statute and adjudicating 
claims far outside the intended scope.441 A proper claim under the CFAA 
features behavior that is criminal because it misuses a computer whereas 
broad interpretations allow claims in which the computer merely facilitates a 
traditional crime.442 Jurisdictions using a broad interpretation incorrectly 
allow employers to haul employees into court for traditional state law crimes 
labeled as a CFAA claim due to the incidental involvement of a computer.443 
Emailing, downloading, or otherwise copying information to use in 
competition with an employer is not the new, emerging computer crime the 
CFAA was created to combat.444 The new, emerging type of crime that the 
                                                 
 436  See supra note 67 (deciding employees who briefly exceeded authorized use 
should be subject to administrative sanctions rather than punished under the CFAA, especially 
in situations where the computer is not clearly delineated to communicate which access is 
prohibited). 
 437  See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text (describing liability under 
broad interpretations).   
 438  See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text (describing liability under 
broad interpretations). 
 439  See supra note 67 (deciding employees who briefly exceeded authorized use 
should be subject to administrative sanctions rather than punished under the CFAA, especially 
in situations where the computer is not clearly delineated to communicate which access is 
prohibited).  
 440  See supra note 67 (deciding employees who briefly exceeded authorized use 
should be subject to administrative sanctions rather than punished under the CFAA, especially 
in situations where the computer is not clearly delineated to communicate which access is 
prohibited). 
 441  See supra Part II.A, text accompanying note 172 (comparing the type of crime 
targeted under the CFAA with a broad interpretation’s holding of liability in misappropriation 
claim). 
 442  See supra Part II.A and accompanying text (describing the different types of 
computer crimes). 
 443  See supra note 237 (correctly dismissing a CFAA claim that should have been 
filed in a state court). 
 444  See supra notes 36–47 (comparing actual crimes targeted by the CFAA to 
traditional crimes already adequately covered by state laws addressing employee misconduct).   
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CFAA was created to combat includes hacking, spreading viruses, and 
intentionally incapacitating or compromising the functionality of a 
computer.445 Misappropriation, unfair competition, tortious interference, and 
breach of contract actions all existed well before the advent of computers and 
remain actionable regardless of any computer involvement.446 Broad 
interpretations allow claims that predate computers and misinterpret the level 
of computer involvement needed to trigger a CFAA claim.447 Broad 
interpretations are wrong because these are not the crimes Congress intended 
for the CFAA.448    
Broad views horrendously abuse the CFAA by penalizing a wide 
swath of less-than-criminal behavior and adjudicating incorrect types of 
crimes under a computer misuse statute targeted primarily at compelling 
federal interest crimes.449 Simply by sticking to an objective analysis and the 
statutory language, narrow interpretations correctly dismiss these 
employment cases, allowing focus and resources to remain trained on the 
real target of the CFAA: crimes of computer misuse.450 Even though narrow 
interpretations require dismissing the kind of misappropriation claims 
typically seen in agency or contract-based interpretations, employers are not 
left without redress.451 Employers are simply forced to re-file in state court, 
or back in federal court basing jurisdiction on complete diversity, where the 
claims should have initially been filed.452 Broad interpretations are clearly 
incorrect applications of the CFAA because they hijack federal judicial 
resources and undermine traditional state powers by adjudicating 
inappropriate claims.453 
                                                 
 445  See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text (creating the CFAA in order to 
effectively prosecute computer crimes that were not susceptible to prosecution under 
traditional, existing criminal statutes). 
 446  See supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text (comparing crimes targeted by 
the CFAA and crimes traditionally governed by states). 
 447  See supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text (comparing crimes targeted by 
the CFAA and crimes traditionally governed by states). 
 448  See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text (creating the CFAA in order to 
effectively prosecute computer crimes that were not susceptible to prosecution under 
traditional, existing criminal statutes). 
 449  See supra notes 234–235 and accompanying text (interpreting the CFAA 
narrowly in order to avoid criminalizing a wide range of innocent activity). 
 450  See supra notes 239–242 and accompanying text (describing a narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA). 
 451  See supra notes 239–242 and accompanying text (describing that breaching an 
employment agreement premised on misuse was an inappropriate CFAA claim since the 
defendant was authorized to access the computer and that appropriate state law remedies were 
still available). 
 452  See supra notes 239–242 and accompanying text (describing that breaching an 
employment agreement premised on misuse was an inappropriate CFAA claim since the 
defendant was authorized to access the computer and that appropriate state law remedies were 
still available). 
 453  See supra text accompanying note 235 (interpreting the CFAA narrowly in 
order to avoid criminalizing a wide range of innocent activity). 
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E.  Broad Interpretations of the CFAA Evoke Federalism Concerns 
 
Broad interpretations far surpass the CFAA’s intended gap-filling 
function by displacing large expanses of state laws.454 Without clear 
congressional intent, courts should not interpret statutes in a way that 
tremendously shifts the federal-state balance.455 Yet that is exactly what 
courts broadly interpreting the CFAA do.456 Broad interpretations allow 
employers to create federal jurisdiction for any dispute involving a 
computer.457 Computers play increasingly prominent roles in society; if all it 
takes to transpose an existing state action into a CFAA claim is the 
involvement of a computer, a majority of state claims could soon be 
extinct.458 Broad interpretations transform the CFAA into a universal federal 
cause of action by allowing employers to completely bypass a wide berth of 
state laws.459 This is an incorrect application of the CFAA because Congress 
sought to balance the statute against existing remedies, not to completely 
displace them. 460 
Not only do broad interpretations of the CFAA usurp traditional state 
powers, they disturb carefully constructed policy preferences and undermine 
substantive law.461 For example, states’ policy-driven trade secret statutes 
become meaningless when employers can label the same action a CFAA 
claim and circumvent carefully constructed evidentiary burdens.462 Broad 
interpretations allow employers to enlist the CFAA to protect information 
that state trade secret law does not protect.463 This undermines deliberate 
                                                 
 454  See supra text accompanying note 47 (describing the CFAA’s role as a gap-
filler to be used when prosecution under existing statutes would be difficult due to computer 
technology). 
 455  See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text (requiring clear congressional 
intent before a court’s interpretation of a statute alters established policy preferences). 
 456  See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text (requiring clear congressional 
intent before a court’s interpretation of a statute alters established policy preferences). 
 457  See supra note 172 and accompanying text (broadly interpreting the CFAA to 
allow traditional state law claims like misappropriation, breach of contract, and theft of trade 
secrets to be litigated in federal court). 
 458  See supra note 172 and accompanying text (broadly interpreting the CFAA to 
allow traditional state law claims like misappropriation, breach of contract, and theft of trade 
secrets to be litigated in federal court). 
 459  See supra note 237 (interpreting the CFAA broadly allows an otherwise state 
law claim access to federal court if a computer is involved). 
 460  See supra Part II.D (detailing the intended scope of the CFAA). 
 461  See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text (comparing the higher 
evidentiary standards typically found in state trade secret statutes to a CFAA claim). 
 462  See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text (comparing the higher 
evidentiary standards typically found in state trade secret statutes to a CFAA claim). 
 463  See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text (comparing the higher 
evidentiary standards typically found in state trade secret statutes to a CFAA claim). 
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policy goals and encourages employers to avoid seeking redress in state 
courts.464  
If Congress meant for federal law to provide redress for 
misappropriation claims, it would have provided a civil cause of action in the 
Economic Espionage Act (EEA) enacted in 1996.465 Congress’s 
incorporation of traditional trade secret law requirements into the federal Act 
suggests an appreciation and support for the policies driving trade secret law 
and a desire to maintain traditional requirements.466 Not providing a private 
cause of action suggests Congress affirmatively intended to not interfere with 
or displace traditional state trade secret law.467 Moreover, it is evident that 
the appropriate scope of the CFAA does not include these claims because 
Congress does not enact duplicative statutes and the EEA covers 
misappropriation claims.468  
Courts narrowly interpreting the CFAA correctly deduce that absent 
explicit congressional intent, the CFAA should not displace substantial 
portions of state law.469 These courts do not say misbehaving employees are 
never liable, just that they are not liable under the CFAA unless they abuse 
access privileges.470 Courts using a narrow interpretation recognize the 
CFAA’s intended scope and respectfully decline jurisdiction over claims that 
fall outside of it.471 A narrow interpretation of the CFAA is the only way to 
ensure that the statute does not eclipse large portions of state law.472 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The CFAA is a criminal statute intended to target new forms of 
computer crimes when no other state or federal statutes apply.473 Its function 
as an effective deterrent to internal and external hacking depends on its 
constitutionality and consistent application. Under broad interpretations, the 
                                                 
 464  See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text (comparing the higher 
evidentiary standards typically found in state trade secret statutes to a CFAA claim). 
 465  See supra note 90 (implementing the EEA in 1996 but providing no private 
cause of action). 
 466  See supra note 90 (implementing the EEA in 1996 but providing no private 
cause of action). 
 467  See supra note 90 (implementing the EEA in 1996 but providing no private 
cause of action). 
 468  See supra note 144 and accompanying text (explaining if another statute would 
apply, the one at issue should not). 
 469  See supra notes 127–129 and accompanying text (presuming Congress acts 
interstitially and will not displace existing law without explicit intent). 
 470  See supra notes 234–236 and accompanying text (arguing a broad 
interpretation of the CFAA would displace large amounts of existing state law). 
 471  See supra notes 234–236 and accompanying text (arguing a broad 
interpretation of the CFAA would displace large amounts of existing state law). 
 472  See supra notes 234–236 and accompanying text (arguing a broad 
interpretation of the CFAA would displace large amounts of existing state law). 
 473  See supra Part II (detailing the legislative purpose of the CFAA). 
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CFAA’s fairly narrow purpose is distorted beyond recognition until it is 
stripped of its intended function and its constitutionality.474 A narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA is the only way the statute remains 
constitutional.475 
A narrow interpretation correctly prioritizes plain language and the 
rule of lenity over reading agency or contract law into definitions.476 
Following these canons of construction, a narrow interpretation of the CFAA 
provides the predictability and notice that due process requires and that broad 
interpretations lack.477 Utilizing canons of constructions and abiding by 
established doctrines, a narrow interpretation effectuates Congressional 
intent and avoids the harmful implications of broad interpretations like 
criminalizing innocent behavior and displacing state laws. Until the Supreme 
Court or Congress step in, courts must interpret the CFAA constitutionally 
and in line with Congressional intent. The plethora of issues surrounding 
broad interpretations makes a narrow interpretation of the CFAA the only 
correct choice.  
 
                                                 
 474  See infra Part V (explaining why broad interpretations of the CFAA are 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; how broad interpretations fail to effectuate 
Congressional intent and incorrectly trample existing state laws). 
 475  See infra Part V.A–B (arguing that a narrow interpretation of the CFAA 
remains constitutional by meeting due process requirements and limiting the statute’s scope to 
only cover punishable conduct). 
 476  See infra Part V.C (arguing that only a narrow interpretation follows 
established canons of construction and, in doing so, is able to accomplish Congress’s intended 
purpose). 
 477  See infra Part V.A–B (arguing that a narrow interpretation of the CFAA 
remains constitutional by meeting due process requirements and limiting the statute’s scope to 
only cover punishable conduct). 
58
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss1/5
